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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Honorable Earl Johnson, Jr. *
The Attorney General spoke to you this morning about the right to
counsel in criminal cases. In doing so, he was talking about a well-estab-
lished principle and one which has been defined in case after case after
case. My assigned topic this morning is the constitutional-or at least
the legally enforceable-right to counsel in civil cases. This right, in con-
trast, is not as yet well-established either in California or anywhere else
in this country. Indeed, the right to counsel in civil cases is best de-
scribed as still glimmering on the horizon. And, at this point, I have
difficulty telling whether it is a reality marching inexorably toward us or
only a mirage forever dangling before the poor citizens of this land.
I think the existence of a right to counsel in civil cases presents diffi-
cult constitutional issues under California and federal law. But I do not
intend to go into those questions today. Instead I am going to take you
on a little excursion. I am going to talk to you about how other countries
have dealt with the right to counsel in civil cases-historically and in the
present. After we complete this excursion, I will give you my impression
of what the California Supreme Court has already decided on the issue.
And finally, I leave you with a series of questions about the relevance to
California of what has happened in other countries and what this might
mean for the way the California Supreme Court deals with this issue in
the future.
I. THE HISTORICAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN EUROPE
As all of you know, the story of the right to counsel in California is
in the process of being written by the California Supreme Court-with
many chapters yet to come. But this story actually begins more than
three centuries before the United States Constitution was adopted, and
more than three and one-half centuries before the California State Con-
* Associate Justice, Second Appellate District Court of Appeal, California. Justice
Johnson was appointed to the court in December, 1982. Formerly a Professor of Law at the
University of Southern California, he was the first recipient of the annual Loren Miller Legal
Services Award in 1977. Among his many published works are: Beyond Payne: The Casefor a
Constitutional Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants, 11 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 249 (co-authored with E. Schwartz); TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1975) (co-authored with M. Cappelletti
& J. Gordley), and JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974).
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stitution came into existence. For it was in 1495, during the reign of
Henry VII and while England was still a Roman Catholic country, that
the King signed a law which remained in effect in England until 1883.
Translated from ancient English into current vernacular, this law said:
And after the said writ or writs be returned,... the justices...
shall assign to the same poor person or persons counsel learned
by their discretions which shall give their counsels nothing tak-
ing for the same, and in likewise the same justices shall appoint
an attorney and attorneys for the same poor person and persons
... which shall do their duties without any rewards.
2
This right did not apply in criminal cases, but in civil cases in the com-
mon law courts.3 Shortly thereafter the right was extended to equity
courts as well.4
So it was almost 500 years ago that a legally enforceable right to
counsel was incorporated into the common law by statute.5 It is note-
worthy that the lawyers appointed to implement this right were expected
to serve without compensation or, in the words of the Statute of Henry
VII, "shall do their duties without any rewards."6 It should also be
noted, however, that in present day England, the right to counsel in civil
1. Statute of Henry VII, 1495, 11 Hen. 7, c. 7, 2 Statutes of the Realm 578 (transcribed in
2 Statutes at Large) (repealed 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49), reprinted in S. POLLOCK, LEGAL
Ai-THE FIRST 25 YEARS 10 (1975).
2. Id. (translated by author).
3. In early common law England defendants did not even have a right to representation
by a lawyer when they could afford to pay his fee. See rehearsal of English legal history on this
question, in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942).
4. See Oldfield v. Cobbett, 41 Eng. Rep. 765 (1845), and cases cited in JONES, THE ELIZ-
ABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 324-28, 501 (1967).
5. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries also witnessed the beginnings of a right to counsel
on the continent of Europe. "In Germany, the medieval practice of assigning poor men coun-
sel culminated in the Reichskammergerichtsordnungen of the late fifteenth and the sixteenth
centuries, and was maintained by the laws of various German states until unification." M.
CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, JR., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 13 (1975) [hereinafter cited as M. CAPPEL-
LETIi] (citing R. SCHOTT, DAS ARMENRECHT DER DEUTSCHEN CIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 4-5
(1900).
In the sixteenth century, the statutes of Milan required the Bar (Collegio degli avyo-
cati) to designate a set of lawyers for the gratuitous defense of the poor; in Tuscany,
the gratuita clientela, instituted in 1767, made the gratuitous defense of the poor an
obligation of lawyers as a class .... These provisions are late instances of a practice
that had spread through other Italian states during the Middle Ages.
Id. at 13 n.35 (citing Ravizza, Patrocinio gratuito, 18 Il DIGESTO ITALIANO I, at 964, 969
(1906-1910)).
"In 1610 ... the King of France commanded that salaried lawyers be retained for the
cases of the poor... ." Id. at 14 (citing Edict of Mar. 6, 1610, of Henri IV, in P. FROTIER DE
LA MESSELIERE, L'AssISTANCE JUDICIAIRE (Etude Historique Et Pratique at 29 (1941)).
6. Statute of Henry VII, 1495, 11 Hen. 7, c. 7, 2 Statutes of the Realm 578 (repealed
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cases is even broader, and lawyers are fully compensated out of govern-
ment funds for the services they provide.7
But I am not ready to come to the twentieth century yet. Nor am I
ready to return to the United States. Instead, let us move on to Conti-
nental Europe. The first landmark year is 1851 and the country, France.
In that year the French Legislature enacted the so-called Law on Legal
Aid, which said that free lawyers should be provided "to all persons...
when these persons ... find it impossible to exercise their legal rights,
whether as plaintiff or as defendant, because of the insufficiency of their
resources."'  This law of 1851 made no provision for compensating the
lawyers appointed to serve indigent litigants. Instead, it was considered a
charitable duty of members of the legal profession to accept these ap-
pointments.9 Indeed, it took 121 years before France reformed its legal
aid system in the law of January 3, 1972 to, among other things, author-
ize government payment of lawyers appointed to represent the poor.10
Now, let us return again to the nineteenth century. The year is 1877
and Count Bismarck is creating the German nation. Included in the
fundamental charter of that nation is a law guaranteeing poor people the
right to counsel in civil cases.11 Once again, the lawyers are expected to
1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49), reprinted in S. POLLOCK, LEGAL AID-THE FIRST 25 YEARS 10
(1975).
7. Legal Aid Act, 1974, C. 4, Part I, reprinted in M. CAPPELLETrl, supra note 5, at 271-
96.
8. The right to counsel in civil cases was first extended throughout France in 1851 with
enactment of the Law of Jan. 22, 1851, arts. 1-20, [1851] Bull. des Lois 93, translated in M.
CAPPELLETrI, supra note 5, at 256-69. In 1901, this legislation was amended to establish a
national system of bureaus to determine eligibility and otherwise administer the system. Law
of July 10, 1901, [1901] Bull. des Lois 3 ("assistancejudiciaire").
9. Under this program, lawyers were appointed to represent all indigent litigants, both
plaintiffs and defendants, who had a "sound case." The lawyers could not refuse an assign-
ment and received no compensation from their clients or the government. However, if victori-
ous, they would be eligible for the attorney fee award owed to the winner by the loser under
the traditional European fee-shifting procedure. For discussions of the 1851 and 1901 French
legal aid laws and their implementation, see Pelletier, Legal Aid in France, 42 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 627 (1967); M. CAPPELLET=, supra note 5, at 39-46. By the mid-1960's, uncompen-
sated appointed lawyers were representing one party, or both, in more than 6.5% of the civil
cases heard in French courts. M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 5, at 44 n.138.
10. Law of Jan. 3, 1972, No. 72-11, J.O. (Jan. 5, 1972), translated in M. CAPPELLETrI,
supra note 5, at 398-406.
11. The right to counsel in civil cases was created in Germany in 1877 with enactment of
sections 114(27) of Zivilprozessordnung of Jan. 30, 1877, which actually became operational on
October 1, 1879. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] § 114(27) (Ger.) (1877). The right itself is
expressed in the following terms:
"A party who is not in a position to pay the costs of litigation without endangering
the necessary support for himself and his family is to have his application for legal
assistance approved, provided that the intended legal action--either as plaintiff or
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provide this representation without compensation. However, this time it
does not take 400 or 500 years for that situation to change. In Germany
it was only 46 years until, in 1923, a law was enacted providing govern-
ment compensation for the lawyers.
12
In the early twentieth century the scene shifts to Northwestern Eu-
rope. In 1915, Norway passed a law creating a right to counsel in civil
cases for indigent Norwegians. 13 Within the decade Sweden, 4 Den-
defendant-shows a sufficient promise of success and does not appear to be
unreasonable."
Klauser & Riegert, Legal Assistance in the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 BUFFALO L. Rnv.
583, 585 (1971) (quoting ZPO § 114(27)).
12. Under the original legislation, the judges appointed lawyers who were required to
serve without compensation or reimbursement for their out-of-pocket expenses. However, in
1919, the law was amended to allow recovery of their actual disbursements. In 1923, further
amendments authorized government payment of legal fees to appointed counsel, although at a
level considerably below the prevailing fee schedule for paying clients. A translated version of
the German legislation appears in M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 5, at 387-92. For a discussion
of the implementation of the law, see id. at 47-52; Klauser & Riegert, supra note 11, at 583.
13. Act No. 6 of 13 August 1915 § 423. Despite this early start, however, Norway has
been slow to modernize its system of delivering this right. For a description of the Norwegian
program, see Boman, Scandinavia, in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 243, 265-71 (F. Zemans
ed. 1974). According to Boman, in most categories of litigation low income people apply to
the Justice Ministry for what is called "free process." (The term "legal aid" is reserved for
legal advice and other out-of-court services.) The applicant must show financial need and a
"reasonable possibility" of prevailing, although the Justice Ministry rarely denies legal assist-
ance on grounds that the applicant's cause lacks merit. Services are given exclusively through
private lawyers compensated according to a not very generous fee schedule. An applicant
must reapply at every discrete stage of the proceedings (e.g., if he desires to appeal). However,
the Ministry reportedly is very liberal in granting "free process" throughout proceedings
where the poor person's opponent is a government agency or a wealthy party, or where the
case involves issues of "precedent-setting significance." In 1980, Norway enacted new legisla-
tion governing legal services in civil cases. Legal Aid Act of 13 June 1980. For a description
of the Act, see INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LEGAL AID 172-75 (J. Lane & S. Hillyard
eds. 1985).
14. Law on Free Legal Proceedings, SFS 1919:387 and NJA 111919, at 617-78, and G & B
2.10.a. This statute gave indigent litigants, both plaintiffs and defendants, free counsel and
relief from other litigation expenses. From the beginning, it also provided government com-
pensation for the lawyers appointed to represent these litigants. The Law on Free Legal Pro-
ceedings did not, however, compensate private lawyers to supply legal advice or other
noncontentious representation to poor people. This need was met, to a limited extent, through
another law also enacted in 1919 which gave state subsidies to official legal aid institutions.
SFS 1919:639, and G & B 2.10.c. For a description of these laws, see Bruzelius & Bolding, An
Introduction to the Swedish Public Legal Aid Reform, in M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 5, at
561-66. By 1968, free legal proceedings were provided to the plaintiff or defendant, or both, in
40.9% of civil trials, in 55.3% of cases in the courts of appeal, and in nearly 12% of cases in
the Swedish Supreme Court. Id. at 563-64 n.13.
In 1973, Sweden put into operation a comprehensive reform of its legal aid system. Public
Legal Aid Law of May 26, 1972, SFS 1972:429, translated in M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 5,
at 526-60. This law established a nationwide network of public law offices staffed with full-
time salaried lawyers. These offices function side-by-side with a national compensated private
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mark 5 and Belgium16 followed suit by creating a right to counsel in civil
cases. And finally, in 1957, the Netherlands passed a law creating the
right to counsel in civil cases for indigent Hollanders."
Is a trend beginning to emerge? When it comes to the legal entitle-
ment to free counsel for indigent civil litigants, the United States is in a
distinct minority among the industrial democracies of the world. 8 But
let us continue on and see just how lonely we are.
We have pretty well covered all of Northern Europe. What about
counsel program. Each client is free to choose a staff lawyer or private lawyer to handle his or
her legal problem. Available services include representation before administrative bodies, legal
advice and other noncontentious legal services, as well as representation in the courts. For a
description of the new Swedish system, see Bruzelius & Bolding, supra, at 568-74. See also
Muther, The Reform ofLegalAid in Sweden, 9 INT'L LAW. 475 (1975); Boman, supra note 13,
at 243-53.
15. In Denmark, the right to counsel in civil cases is part of the program of "free process,"
and is available to much of the middle class as well as the poor. The governing law is found in
the Procedural Code (Retsplejeloven) and Special Proclamation No. 562, Dec. 19, 1969.
Boman, supra note 13, at 255. Persons desiring "free process" apply to the regional govern-
ment. The application will be granted if the applicant meets a rather generous financial eligi-
bility standard and has a case he "would have pursued... if he had had means of his own to
do so." Id. at 257. However, customarily this benefit is not available to litigate defamation or
pure collection cases. Id. "Free process" includes a free lawyer unless the case is so simple the
litigant can represent himself effectively, or unless he is a person with sufficient means to afford
at least part of the expenses of litigating the case. The courts-rather than the regional gov-
ernments-appoint the lawyers and decide the level of compensation the government will pay
in each case. At the time the 1959 proclamation was filed, it established financial criteria
making full or partial "free process" available to about 85% of adult Danes. Id. For a de-
scription of the current Danish program of "free process," see id. at 254-58.
16. Belgium has a right to counsel in civil cases as part of its Code of Civil Procedure.
Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 455. The right is implemented through an uncompensated pri-
vate counsel system similar to the pre-1972 French legal aid law. See supra notes 8-9. For a
description of the Belgian legal aid program, see Pelgrims, L'aide Juridique en Belgique, 2
CANADIAN LEGAL AID BULL. 348 (1978). In recent years a movement has started to create
so-called "law shops" staffed by lawyers working essentially full-time to serve poor people.
For a description of these offices, see B. GARTH, NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THE POOR
125-27 (1980).
17. In 1957, the Netherlands enacted a comprehensive compensated private counsel sys-
tem modeled on England's system. B. GARTH, supra note 16, at 118 (citing Royal Decree of
24 Dec. 1957). By 1972, nearly half the civil cases tried in Dutch courts involved one or more
parties who were receiving legal aid. For a brief description of the Netherlands legal aid sys-
tem, see B. GARTH, supra note 16, at 118-24. See also Boer, Going Dutch on Legal Aid, 3
LEGAL SERVICES BULL. 19 (1978); Schuyt, Groenendijk & Sloot, Access to the Legal System
and Legal Services Research, in EUROPEAN Y.B. IN LAW AND Soc. 98 (B. Blegvad, C. Camp-
bell & C. Schuyt eds. 1977); Ginsburg, The Availability of Legal Services to Poor People and
People of Limited Means in Foreign Systems, 6 INT'L LAW. 128, 160-62 (1972).
18. South Africa is about the only industrialized noncommunist country other than the
United States which still does not have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel in civil
cases. See Gross, South Africa, in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 295-96 (F. Zemans ed.
1974). It does have, however, like the United States, a modest government-funded legal aid
program which furnishes representation to some poor people in civil cases.
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Central and Southern Europe? Well, Austria has had a right to counsel
in civil cases since 1895.19 Spain has had such a statutory right since at
least 1855.20 Portugal has had such a right since 1899.21 In Italy the
right goes back to the birth of that nation in 186522 and was reinforced
by the legal aid law of 1923.23
19. In Austria, a law enacted in 1781 exempted poor people from payment of court fees,
JUSTIZGESETZSAMMLUNG [JGS] 28 (Aus.), and a decree of 1791 provided for appointment of
free counsel to represent them in civil cases. JGS 106, HOFDEKRET VOM 24.1.1791. This right
was incorporated in the Zivilprozessordnung in 1895. It provided that judges must appoint
lawyers to represent poor people in all civil cases where there appeared some possible merit in
their claim or defense. Then in 1973, Austria enacted a new Legal Aid Act which, among
other things, simplified the process of demonstrating indigency. BUNDESGESETZ VOM
8.11.1973. Lawyers appointed to represent poor people do not receive direct compensation for
their services. However, the government does make a payment into a bar association pension
fund in recognition of these efforts. See infra note 66. For a description of the Austrian legis-
lation and its implementation, see Konig, Austria, in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 76-92 (F.
Zemans ed. 1974).
20. The right to counsel in Spain can be traced back to an 1835 law establishing the duty
to "Administer... complete justice to those who, according to the laws, are in the class of the
poor, in the same fashion as to those who pay; taking care as well that in all litigation they
should be defended and aided without any charge, as they should, by the lawyers and court
officers." Regulations for the Administration of Justice of September 26, 1835, Arts. 2, 36. In
1855 Spain enacted its first Law of Spanish Civil Procedure. Articles 179-200 of this law deal
with "defense for the poor" and exempt poor people from all legal expenses, taxes, tariffs and
professional fees. These provisions have remained in effect, with only slight modifications, to
the present day. For a critical examination of this statute and its implementation, see Miguel y
Alonso, Spain, in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 302-17 (F. Zemans ed. 1974). Free legal aid
is available to anyone earning roughly 40% or less of the country's median income. Nonethe-
less, in 1972, legal aid was supplied in only 2.53% of the civil cases tried in Spanish courts. In
1973, this amount fell slightly to 2.51%. Id. at 303. A partial explanation for this disparity
may be that the government provided no compensation for lawyers appointed to represent
indigent litigants until 1975. This modest fund of 100 million pesetas was increased to 200
million pesetas in 1976. Id. at 309-10.
21. In Portugal, the right to counsel in civil cases goes back to a statute enacted in 1899
which was amended extensively in 1944 and 1970. Law No. 7/70 (June 9). The more recent
version resembles the pre-1972 French legal aid system of uncompensated appointed private
lawyers. See supra note 9. For an extensive discussion of the Portuguese legislation, see A.
VIDAL, A ASSISTENCIA JUDICIARIA Nos TRIBUNAIS ORDINARIOS (1971). See also M. CAP-
PELLETTI, supra note 5, at 270.
22. As in Germany, the right to counsel in civil cases in Italy came into existence shortly
after nationhood was achieved. Law of Dec. 6, 1865, No. 2627 (1865 Rae. Uff. 2846) (Italy).
At that time, lawyers were required to serve without compensation.
23. The poor person's right to counsel and the lawyer's duty to provide representation
without compensation continue to the present day through provisions of the Italian Constitu-
tion and the 1923 legal aid law. "Poor persons shall, by institutions created for that purpose,
be assured the means to plead and to defend themselves before any judicial jurisdiction." M.
CAPPELLETTI, supra note 5, at 245-46 (translating Costuzione, art. 24 (1948)). "1. Legal aid
to the poor is an honorary and obligatory duty of the class of attorneys. 2. Admission to legal
aid takes place in civil, commercial, or other contentious and non-contentious cases, as well as
in criminal cases." Id. at 246-52 (translating Royal Decree of Dec. 30, 1923, No, 3282 (Ap-
proving the Law on Legal Aid)). According to Italian observers, however, this system is ad-
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But the most important lesson for our purposes may come from the
tiny nation of Switzerland. As all of you must recall from eighth-grade
history, Switzerland is a confederation. By definition, a confederation is
a looser association of individual states-they call them cantons-than
our federal system. What I did not learn in eighth-grade world history,
and you may have missed this also, is that the Swiss Constitution con-
tains what in essense is an "equal protection" clause. It is called the
"6galit6 before the law" provision and it is article 4 of the Constitution of
the Swiss Confederation. a It is a short and simple section. It merely
says: "All Swiss are equal before the law. In Switzerland there is neither
subjection or privilege of locality, birth, family or person."2
What makes this significant for our purposes is that in 1937, almost
one-half century ago, the Swiss Supreme Court was called upon to con-
strue this constitutional guarantee and its implications for indigent Swiss
who were involved in civil litigation. That court had no difficulty in
holding that "all Swiss" meant "all Swiss"-including those who are
poor.26 The court also had no trouble in finding that no litigant has
"egalit6 before the law" if required to defend himself or herself in a court
of law without a lawyer.2 7 Consequently, it held in the case titled Judg-
ment of October 8th, 1937 that the constitutional principle of "6galit
before the law" mandates that each canton ensure that indigent civil liti-
gants are afforded free legal representation "in a civil matter where the
handling of the trial demands knowledge of the law."2
This pretty well takes care of Western Europe. Beyond that, what
of the other industrial democracies scattered across the globe? By the
early 1970's, New Zealand 9 and nearly all the Australian states30 had
ministered in ways which minimize the amount of legal assistance the poor actually receive, as
well as the degree of sacrifice the Italian legal profession actually experiences. See, ag., Cap-
pelletti, Poor People's Justice, 91 Foro It. V 114 (1968); Forcella, An Illuminating Aspect, I1
Giorno (Milano), Apr. 23, 1969; M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 5, at 33-39.
24. Bundesverfassung, Constitution fed6rale, constituzione federale, art. 4, translated in
M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 5, at 705 n.*.
25. M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 5, at 705 n.* (translating BVERF., CONST., COsT. FED.
art. 4).
26. Shefer-Heer contre Conseil d'Etat d'Appenszell Rhodes-Exterieures, 8 Oct. 1937, Ar-
rets du Tribunal Federal, 63, I, 209, excerpt translated in O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel
in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1967).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. In 1969, New Zealand enacted a law based on the English legal aid scheme. Legal Aid
Act 1969 (N.Z.). Under this program, low income litigants are legally entitled to representa-
tion by compensated private counsel in civil litigation in the courts. For a brief description of
the legislation and its implementation, see INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LEGAL AID, supra
note 13, at 165-67.
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created a right to counsel. Meanwhile, during the 1960's and 1970's,
nearly all the provinces of Canada--one by one-enacted statutes creat-
ing a comprehensive right to counsel for low income Canadians in civil
litigation. 1 In most instances, the legislation simultaneously funded the
lawyers needed to provide this representation. Some provinces accom-
plished this by paying the fees of private lawyers who worked on civil
cases for indigents. Other set up salaried attorney programs to do the
same, like American legal services agencies. And Quebec Province, Can-
ada, did both.32 Quebec created a province-wide network of neighbor-
hood law offices staffed by salaried attorneys and also set up a fund to
compensate private lawyers for those clients who preferred private coun-
sel over, salaried staff lawyers. But more important to the present issue is
the part of the Quebec law specifying who is to receive free legal repre-
sentation. The Quebec statute is typical of other Canadian provinces. It
defines the right in the following language: "An economically underpriv-
ileged person who can establish ... the need of legal services is entitled to
receive legal aid under this act .... ,3
Some of these historical developments in Europe and elsewhere bear
more directly on the right to counsel in California than do others. As
might be expected, what has happened in our mother country, England,
appears more relevant. As you will recall, there has been a legal right to
counsel in civil cases under the common law of England since the Statute
30. Legal aid in Australia is administered principally by state governments, not the federal
government. During the 1960's and early 1970's, most states set up programs resembling the
English scheme of compensated private lawyers. Although one commentator observed that
there was no absolute right to counsel in civil cases, as a practical matter any poor person
received legal assistance if he or she had "'reasonable ground for taking, defending or being a
party to proceedings.'" Epstein, Australia, in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 53 (F. Zemans
ed. 1974) (quoting Queensland Act, § 19(3)). For a description of the aid programs, see id. at
42-75.
31. The right to counsel, and legal aid in general, is determined on a province-by-province
basis in Canada. Starting with Ontario in 1966, nearly all Canadian provinces have developed
comprehensive legal aid programs in civil as well as criminalcases. Indeed, as of 1979, only
Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick had not yet established legal aid services for civil
cases. Zemans, Canada, in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 93-97 (F. Zemans ed. 1974).
32. The various Canadian provinces have followed different approaches. For example,
Ontario relies primarily on a compensated private counsel system, administered by the Law
Society, which closely resembles the English legal aid scheme. Saskatchewan has set up a
network of "community law offices" similar to the American legal services program, but more
generously financed on a per capita basis. And Quebec has innovated with a "mixed system,"
offering clients a choice between compensated private lawyers and salaried staff lawyers sta-
tioned at neighborhood offices. For a description of the Canadian legal aid programs, see id. at
93-133. For a description of the Quebec "mixed system," see M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 5,
at 584-619.
33. Legal Aid Act, ch. 14, Div. II § 4 (1972), reprinted in M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 5,
at 585-86 (emphasis added).
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of Henry VII in 1495. 34 This is legally significant because California's
first legislature said that the common law of California is to be the com-
mon law of England as that law stood in 1850.35 Then, in 1917, the
California Supreme Court, in the case of Martin v. Superior Court,36 spe-
cifically applied this principle to the in forma pauperis rights of indigent
civil litigants in California. It held that those rights are to be defined by
what indigent English litigants enjoyed under the common law of Eng-
land as it existed when California became a state in 1850. 3 7 True, Martin
only involved waiver of court fees.38 Nonetheless, when the supreme
court set out in the Martin opinion to ascertain the scope of in forma
pauperis rights under the English common law, it looked primarily to the
writings of two noted English legal scholars-Blackstone and Marshall.
In its opinion, the supreme court quoted the following language from
Blackstone's classic Commentary on Law: "'[P]aupers ... are ... to
have original writs and subpoenas gratis, and counsel and attorney as-
signed them without fee; and are excused from paying costs .... ,' 9
Then, from Marshall on the Law of Costs in All Suits and Proceedings in
Courts of Common Law, the supreme court quoted the following lan-
guage: "'With a view to enable such poor persons as have not ability to
pay the expenses incidental to the prosecution of an action to enforce
their rights, . . . the plaintiff is exempt from the payment of court fees,
and he is entitled to the service of counsel, and of an attorney, who render
their services without reward.' ""
What you will notice is that both of these English scholars listed as
one of the rights enjoyed by indigent civil litigants in England the right to
have a free lawyer. In view of the Statute of Henry VII, which was al-
ready more than 250 years old when these gentlemen were writing their
34. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
35. CAL. Civ. CODE § 22.2 (West 1982) states: "The common law of England, so far as it
is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitu-
tion or laws of this State is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State." Previously this
provision was found in § 4468 of the now defunct Political Code which was first enacted in
1850.
36. 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
37. In Martin, the California Supreme Court held that this legislation incorporated the
English common law as "the whole body of that jurisprudence as it stood, influenced by stat-
ute, at the time when the code section was adopted. And more than that, that it embraced also
... the great handmaiden and coadjutor of the common law, equity." Id. at 293, 168 P. at 136.
See also, e.g., Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971); People
v. One 1941 Chevolet Coupe, 37 Cal 2d. 283, 286-91, 231 P.2d 832, 835-38 (1951); Moore v.
Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal. 2d 835, 838, 118 P.2d 1, 4 (1941).
38. 176 Cal. at 293, 168 P.2d at 135.
39. Id. at 294, 168 P. at 137 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 294-95, 168 P. at 137 (emphasis added).
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treatises, this is not a particularly startling revelation. However, what is
interesting is that the California Supreme Court, in describing the in
forma pauperis rights which are incorporated into the California com-
mon law, included the right to appointment of counsel, not merely the
right to proceed without payment of court costs.
I leave you to speculate whether and when the California Supreme
Court will breathe life into this dictum which has lain like a legal sleep-
ing beauty buried in Martin. The appellant in Martin had a lawyer, so
that was not an issue in 1917. One suspects that sometime in the future
the supreme court will have to face the question of whether indigent Cali-
fornia litigants indeed are to enjoy the full in forma pauperis rights indi-
gent Englishmen enjoyed in 1850-and for 350 years before then.
When we shift from the common law to the constitutional grounds
for a right to counsel, not only England but the example of the other
European democracies becomes relevant-in a number of ways. I al-
ready mentioned the Swiss Supreme Court and its interpretation of a
constitutional provision virtually identical in language and content to our
own equal protection clause.4 It should be noted that the West German
Constitutional Court applied a similar "equality before the law" provi-
sion as well as a "fair hearing" provision-which is analogous to Ameri-
can due process-in deciding whether and when that nation's
Constitution demanded appointment of counsel even when the legal aid
system would not.42
41. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
42. For instance, in Decision of June 18, 1957 (No. 6), 7 BVERFG 54 (1958), translated in
M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 5, at 697-700, the Federal Constitutional Court held that the
lower court erred in denying a guardian's request for legal aid to defend a child against a claim
that he was illegitimate. The denial was based on the trial court's finding that the child lacked
"sufficient probability of success" in defending the action. The Court conceded that it had
earlier affirmed that it is not unconstitutional and, in particular, that it does not
violate the principle of equality the right to a fair hearing if section 114 of the ZPO
makes the granting of legal aid,. . . dependent on the assertion by plaintiff of a legal
claim which offers a sufficient probability of success and does not appear frivolous.
M. CAPPELLETrTi, supra note 5, at 698 (translating Decision of June 18, 1957 (No. 6)). None-
theless, the Constitutional Court reversed the lower court denial of legal aid:
The challenged decision rests on the basic premise that a party who does not request
legal aid would, after appropriate evaluation of the circumstances, do without repre-
sentation by counsel in these proceedings since the obligation of the court to investi-
gate the fact situation in an ex officio manner is sufficient to assure a just and proper
decision.... The interpretation on which the challenged decision is based causes the
defendant to become nothing more than an object of the proceeding, while the law
itself assigns to him the formal position of an autonomous party to the proceed-
ing....
The challenged decision must therefore be annulled and the cause remanded....
... It appears constitutionally doubtful that the law, on the one hand would
assign the role of defendant involuntarily to a participant in a dispute over a question
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These decisions by foreign courts are hardly precedent in the State
of California. But is their logic so easy to escape? I leave this question to
you as well.
The European example also is relevant at a more fundamental level.
Due process is not a static concept. Rather it is a living principle. At a
certain stage of history due process only requires certain procedural
rights, but at a later stage the concept requires something more, and at a
still later stage even more. Over the past two centuries, the kings and
princes, and the legislatures and constitutional courts of nearly every'Eu-
ropean country-including all of the major ones-as well as nearly all
the other industrial democracies on this globe, have come to recognize
that courts cannot be fair unless indigent parties have lawyers in civil
cases as well as in criminal cases. Significantly, this series of independent
decisions in country after country implemented a fundamental demo-
cratic theory-the notion that the individual would not surrender his
natural right to settle disputes through force unless society offered him a
peaceful forum where he had a fair chance of winning when he was
right.4 3 And so it is quite natural to find a major international body
representing nearly all the other industrial democracies, the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, adopting a resolution in 1978 that
states that "a right to necessary legal aid" and "the right of access to
justice and to a fair hearing" constitute "an essential feature of any dem-
ocratic society."'  Would it be out of line to ask at what point does a
right so universally recognized throughout western civilization as an es-
sential ingredient of fair procedure and democratic government also be-
of status, and on the other-if he is poor-impede him in his participation as a party
on the basis that he does not have sufficient probability of success.
Id. at 698-700 (translating Decision of June 18, 1957 (No. 6)). See also Judgment of June 17,
1953 (No. 26), BVERFG 336 (1953) ("The fact that the legislature has not granted legal aid...
allows one to conclude that the legislature decided to exclude the granting of legal aid in the
former type of cases. The courts must determine, however, whether this denial by the legisla-
ture is still consonant with the Constitution.").
43. The place of equal access to the courts and, by implication a right to counsel, in "social
contract" theory is explored in Johnson & Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally
Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants, 11 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 249, 290-95 (1978).
44. Resolution (78) 8 on Legal Aid and Advice and Explanatory Memorandum 5-6 (1978)
(emphasis added). The Council of Europe comprises the member nations of the European
Economic Community and most of the other industrial democracies on the European conti-
nent. The Resolution reads in pertinent part:
Considering that the right of access to justice and to a fair hearing, as guaranteed
under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is an essential feature
of any democratic society;
Considering that it is therefore important to take all necessary steps with a view
to eliminating economic obstacles, legal proceedings and that the existence of appro-
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come an integral part of due process and equal protection in this
country?
If this universality needed judicial confirmation, it was provided in
1979. The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms established a minimal but essential level of
basic human rights the eighteen signatory European nations are expected
to maintain.4 1 It is very much a floor, not some pie-in-the-sky dream of
what human beings should enjoy. Article 6, section 1 of this Convention
deals with civil proceedings in the courts and says simply: "In the deter-
mination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."
' 6
priate systems of legal aid will contribute to the achievement of the same especially
for those in an economically weak position;
Considering that the provision of legal aid should no longer be regarded as a
charity to indigent persons but as an obligation of the community as a whole;
[The Committee of Ministers] recommends the governments of member states to
take... all measures which they consider necessary with a view to the progressive
implementation of the principles set out in the Appendix to this Resolution;
Appendix to Resolution (78) 8
I. No one should be prevented by economic obstacles from pursuing or de-
fending his right before any court determining civil, commercial, administrative, so-
cial or physical matters. To this end, all persons should have a right to necessary
legal aid and proceedings....
3. Legal aid should provide for all costs necessarily incurred by the assisted
person in pursuing or defending his legal rights and in particular lawyer fees, costs of
experts, witnesses and translations....
5. Legal aid should always include the assistance of a person professionaly
qualified to practice law in accordance with the provisions of the state's regulations,
not only where the national legal aid system always of itself so provides, but also:
a. when representation by such a person before a court of a state is compulsory
in accordance with state's law;
b. when the competent authority of the granting of legal aid finds that such
assistance is necessary having regard for the circumstances of the particular case.
... The person so appointed should be adequately remunerated for the work he
does on behalf of the assisted person.
7. The legal aid system should provide for a review of a decision to refuse a
grant of legal aid.
8. The responsibility for financing the legal aid system should be assumed by
the state.
Resolution (78) 8 on Legal Aid and Advice and Explanatory Memorandum 5-7 (1978).
45. The European Convention Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
[hereinafter cited and referred to as European Convention] went into effect on Sept. 3, 1953,
when the tenth country ratified it. See M. CAPPELLE'rn, supra note 5, at 657. The signatory
nations include Austria, Belgium, Cypress, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Id. at 658 n.***.
46. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
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This Convention is interpreted by the so-called European Court of
Human Rights containing justices drawn from the member states.4 7 It is
the closest thing to a Supreme Court of Europe presently existing. In
1979, in a case called Airey v. Ireland,48 an indigent Irish woman com-
plained she had been denied a lawyer to litigate her judicial separation
case. She could not afford an attorney, and neither the Irish government
nor the High Court of Ireland had given her one. In a landmark deci-
sion, the European Court of Human Rights held member states, under
the language of the provision I just quoted, must afford their citizens a
"fair hearing."' 49 And the court held this means that they either have to
set up simplified procedures and forums where lawyers are unnecessary,
47. In addition to the Court, two other bodies also are involved in enforcement of the
European Convention. These are the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and
the European Commission of Human Rights. Most applications for relief are first submitted to
the Commission. Once this body determines that the European Convention is being violated,
it attempts to negotiate with the offending government. If unsuccessful in this attempt, the
Commission can take the matter either to the Committee of Ministers or to the European
Court of Human Rights. This choice tends to depend upon political and practical factors. Id.
at 658-60.
48. Airey Case, 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 428 (Eur. Court on Human
Rights) (summary of result), Eur. Court H.R., Airey Case, Judgment of 9 Oct. 1979 Series A
No. 32 (full text of opinion).
49. In Airey, the European Court of Human Rights first held Article 6 § I of the European
Convention established a right of access to the courts in civil cases: "[In] the Golder judgment
of 21 February 1975 (Series A no. 18)... the Court held that [Article 6 § I] embodies the right
of access to a court for the determination of civil rights and obligations." Airey, Eur. Court
H.R., Judgment of 9 Oct. 1979, Series A No. 32, 12.
The court then held that Mrs. Airey had a right of access to the courts for her judicial
separation action: "There can be no doubt that the outcome of separation proceedings is 'deci-
sive for private rights and obligations' and hence, a fortiori for 'civil rights and obligations'
within the meaning of Article 6 § I; this being so, Article 6 § I is applicable to the present
case." Id.
Then the court turned to the crucial issue of what is meant by "access to the courts":
The [Irish] Government contend [sic] that the applicant does enjoy access to the
[Irish] High Court since she is free to go before the court without the assistance of a
lawyer.
The Court does not regard this possibility, of itself, as conclusive of the matter.
The Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but
rights that are practical and effective. [citations omitted]. This is particularly so of
the right of access to the courts in view of the prominent place held in a democratic
society by the right to a fair trial. [citations ommited]. It must therefore be ascer-
tained whether Mrs. Airey's appearance before the High Court without the assist-
ance of a lawyer would be effective, in the sense of whether she would be able to
present her case properly and satisfactorily.
It seems certain to the Court that the applicant would be at a disadvantage if her
husband were represented by a lawyer and she were not. Quite apart from this eventu-
ality, it is not realistic, in the Court's opinion, to suppose that, in litigation of this
nature, the applicant could effectively conduct her own case, despite the assistance
which, as was stressed by the Government, the judge affords to parties acting in
person.
... A specialist in Irish family law ... regards the High Court as the least
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or they must supply free lawyers to those citizens who cannot afford their
own lawyers in regular courts.5 The story has a happy ending. Mrs.
Airey received a financial award to pay for a lawyer5 and Ireland has
expanded its legal aid program to comply with this minimal standard
established by the European Court of Human Rights. Since, as we have
already seen, most countries in Europe already guarantee a fairly com-
prehensive right to counsel in civil cases, this decision will not have much
practical effect on that continent. But the upshot is that, as a practical
matter, the right to counsel in civil cases has now been recognized to be
accessible court... by reason of the fact that "the procedure for instituting proceed-
ings... is complex .. "
Furthermore, litigation of this kind, in addition to involving complicated points
of law, necessitates proof of adultery, unnatural practices or, as in the present case,
cruelty; to establish the facts, expert evidence may have to be tendered and witnesses
may have to be found, called and examined.
... [It is] most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey's position.., can effec-
tively present his or her own case. This view is corroborated [by the fact] that in
each of the 255 judicial separation proceedings initiated in Ireland in the period from
January 1972 to December 1978, without exception, the petitioner was represented
by a lawyer...
The Court concludes from the foregoing that the possibility to appear in person
before the High Court does not provide the applicant with an effective right of access.
Id. at 12-14 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court found there had been a breach of Arti-
cle 6 § I. Id. at 16.
50. The European Court of Human Rights in Airey recognized that society can afford
effective access to the courts by simplifying the law and the procedures so that a layman does
not need a lawyer to successfully present, or defend, a claim.
In certain eventualities, the possibility of appearing before a court in person, even
without a lawyer's assistance, will meet the requirements of Article 6 § I....
... [W]hilst Article 6 § I guarantees to litigants an effective right of access to the
courts for the determination of their "civil rights and obligations," it leaves to the
State a free choice of the means to be used towards this end.., such as, for example,
a simplification of procedure....
... However... Article 6 § I may sometimes compel the State to provide for the
assistance of a lawyer ... by reasons of the complexity of the procedure or of the case.
Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
51. The European Court of Human Rights in Airey also dealt expressly with the conten-
tion that it is poverty, not the judicial system or the government, which denies effective access
to those unable to employ their own lawyers.
The [Irish] Government maintain [sic] that ... in the present case there is no positive
obstacle emanating from the State and no deliberate attempt by the State to impede
access: the alleged lack of access to court stems not from any act on the part of the
authorities but solely from Mrs. Airey's personal circumstances, a matter for which
Ireland cannot be held responsible under the Convention.
... [T]he Court does not agree.... In the first place, hindrance in fact can
contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment. [citation omitted]. Further-
more, fulfillment of a duty under the Convention on occasion necessitates some posi-
tive action on the part of the State; in such circumstances, the State cannot simply
remain passive and "there is... no room to distinguish between acts and omissions."
[citations omitted]. The obligation to secure an effective right of access to the courts
falls into this category of duty.
Id. at 14.
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one of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the European Con-
vention of Human Rights.
This poses still another question for this audience. Are the proce-
dures in California courts so much simpler, and our laws so much easier
to interpret, that the lawyers deemed essential to comply with the stan-
dard of a "fair hearing" in Europe are not essential to "due process" in
the United States? Or, to put it another way, since the right to counsel in
civil cases is now deemed "a fundamental human right" by most of west-
ern civilization, how much more is required before it becomes an essen-
tial ingredient of due process in this country?
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CALIFORNIA
It is against this backdrop that the California Supreme Court has in
the last decade taken the first short, tentative steps towards a right to
counsel in California. In Payne v. Superior Court,52 it held that equal
protection requires the appointment of counsel for indigent civil defend-
ants who are in prison and thus unable to effectively represent them-
selves. 3 The decision is really based on the most primitive notion of
access to the courts--one which holds that a litigant has access to the
courts if allowed to be physically present at the hearing and to put before
the court whatever evidence he may be capable of gathering.54 A pris-
oner is physically incapable of gathering and presenting evidence-in-
deed it may not be feasible for him to take depositions, look for witnesses,
appear at hearings on motions and all the rest.55 Consequently, accord-
ing to the supreme court in Payne, he must be given a lawyer to perform
all those functions. 6 The unanswered question is whether in reality indi-
gent litigants of any stripe-whether in prison or free on the streets-
possess the knowledge, the experience and the skill to have effective, as
opposed to physical, access to the courts. The European Court of
Human Rights had no trouble spotting the absurdity of regarding physi-
cal access as effective access to the courts.57 But the Payne opinion ig-
nores or perhaps merely sidesteps this patent absurdity.
It is for this reason that Salas v. Cortez58 represents a longer stride
toward a true right to counsel for indigent civil litigants than Payne. In
52. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
53. Id. at 924, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
54. This is the notion of "access to justice" which was expressly rejected by the European
Court of Human Rights. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
55. 17 Cal. 3d at 923, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
56. Id. at 924, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
57. See supra notes 49-51.
58. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
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Salas, there were no physical impediments preventing the alleged father
from gathering and presenting evidence in the paternity suit. So, in that
very primative sense of access, he had access to the courts. Nonetheless,
the California Supreme Court held he had a right to free counsel, 9 in
effect a right to effective access to the courts. Still, Salas is also a very
limited case. It was the government, not a private party, which sought to
invoke the coercive power of the court against the indigent litigant. 60
And, it was not only money or property at stake-which after all are the
usual ingredients of civil litigation-but rather the determination of
whether this man would forever be considered the father of this child.
Significantly, the California Supreme Court placed no such limitation on
its holding in Salas.6" And, it should be added, the court in Payne ex-
pressly reserved the question whether the constitution requires appoint-
ment of free counsel for indigent civil litigants who are not prisoners.62
And now comes Yarbrough v. Superior Court. 63 Looking to the Eu-
ropean experience, this case would appear to be premature. The pattern
in most of these countries was for the legislature or the courts to first
establish a relatively comprehensive right to counsel in civil cases. 4
Only after years or decades or centuries of appointing uncompensated
lawyers to provide that representation did the issue of compensation
come to the fore. One might say California is putting the cart before the
horse. Still, if we can draw a lesson from these other countries, it is a
question that inevitably must be confronted. Moreover, it may be com-
forting to observe that with only two or three exceptions 65 every one of
these countries has eventually decided-as a matter of sound policy if not
of right-that lawyers who are asked to fulfill the state's obligation to
59. Id. at 34, 593 P.2d at 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
60. Id. at 24, 593 P.2d at 228, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
61. Id. at 34, 592 P.2d at 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
62. Payne, 17 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 553 P.2d at 578, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
63. 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
64. See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text.
65. According to the most recent information that this author has been able to obtain,
Italy is the only industrial democracy in Europe that still does not compensate lawyers who
represent poor people in civil cases. See supra note 23. However, in Austria, only indirect
compensation is offered. This takes the form of a lump sum payment by the government to a
bar association pension fund subsidizing lawyers incapable of making a living-those tempo-
rarily indisposed, widows and orphans of lawyers, and the like. The adequacy of this lump
sum payment and the entire Austrian scheme was successfully challenged by a leading member
of the Austrian bar, Dr. H. Gussenbauer, in the early 1970's. See Judgment of Dec. 19, 1972,
Supp. (Beilage) (Feb. 1973) Osterreichisches Anwaltsblatt, translated in M. CAPPELLETrT,
supra note 5, at 721. In response to this decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court, the
government nearly tripled its contribution to the bar association pension fund. However, it
evidently does not provide any direct payment to the lawyers appointed to represent indigents.
INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LEGAL AID, szpra note 13, at 38.
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provide representation to poor people are entitled to be compensated by
the government for those services. 6
I also see the possibility the horse may stumble over the cart here in
California. The supreme court may be hesitant to move in the direction
of a comprehensive right to counsel in civil cases-even where it thinks
this course is compelled by either the common law or constitutional prin-
ciples-if each step on that path carries a price tag. The possibility is
especially great if they-and we-overestimate the cost of a right to
counsel in civil cases.
So let us try to put that price tag into perspective. Americans pay
out something in the neighborhood of $40 billion a year in legal fees to
private lawyers for representation in civil cases.67 In contrast, the budget
of the Legal Services Corporation, which is nearly the sole source of
funding for legal services to the at least 20% of our population unable to
afford legal fees, is only a little more than $300 million.68 Thus, the gov-
ernmental funding of civil legal services for the poor represents less than
1% of the total national expenditure on the services of lawyers in civil
cases.
Translating these figures to California, the citizens of our state
spend somewhere between $4 and $5 billion a year on lawyers, 69 nearly
all of that in civil cases. At the same time, the Legal Service Corpora-
66. Among the nations which do provide at least government compensation to the lawyers
representing poor people are: Australia, see supra note 30; Belgium, see supra note 16; Canada,
see supra notes 31-33; Denmark, see supra note 15; and England, see supra note 7.
67. The most recent official data is for 1983 and reflects $32.5 billion expended on lawyer
services in the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 437 (Table No. 727), 780 (Table No. 1395) (1985) [herein-
after cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. However, these expenditures are on a steep upward
curve, having increased almost $9 billion between 1981 and 1983-from $23.7 billion to $32.5
billion. Id. Assuming any similar rate of increase since 1983, the 1985 totals would easily
surpass the $40 billion mark.
68. The Legal Services Corporation budget for fiscal year 1985 was $305 million.
Although it represents an increase over the previous three fiscal years, this figure remains
substantially below the $321 million appropriated for the Corporation in fiscal year 1981. 1981
LEGAL SERV. CORP. ANN. REP. 38.
69. The $4 to $5 billion figure can be estimated based on national expenditure and employ-
ment data. As of 1980, California had approximately 12.6% of the practicing lawyers in the
United States. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 67, at 177 (Table No. 301). Assuming
those lawyers receive their proportionate share of the roughly $40 billion to be spent on law-
yers nationally during 1985-but no more--California lawyers will receive $5.05 billion in the
current year. On the other hand, assuming the California legal profession's gross receipts are
proportionate to this state's share of the total United States population, rather than its lawyer
population, the figure will be closer to $4 billion. It should be noted that in 1980 of Califor-
nia's 64,840 lawyers, 46,601 were in private practice. Id. Since 1980, the California legal
profession has grown dramatically, and undoubtedly represents more than 12.6% of the prac-
ticing bar in this country. For this reason, as well as the size of the California economy, it
358 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:341
tion's allocation to all the legal services programs in California amounted
to a little over $21 million in 1984-about one-half of 1% of what
Californians spend on lawyers for the other 75% or 80% of the
population.
When it comes to investment in civil legal services for the poor,
America suffers by comparison with other countries as well. At the pres-
ent time, the United States government is spending a little more than $1
per capita on civil legal services for the poor, or $300 million for a popu-
lation of 225 million people. Meanwhile, England, with a much smaller
economy, manages to allocate more than $4 per capita for civil legal serv-
ices for poor people.7" This places England right up there with Canada7 1
and the Netherlands 72 -both in the neighborhood of $4 per capita-and
Sweden 7 3-well over $3 per capita.
In attempting to estimate the likely cost of implementing a compre-
hensive right to counsel in civil cases, the Province of Quebec may pro-
vide the most instructive example. This Province has had comprehensive
right to counsel in civil cases for more than a decade.74 During the last
few years the saturation level has been approached. The case load has
nearly leveled off and so have the budget expenditures.7" Looking only at
would not be a surprise to find this state's share of national expenditures on lawyers actually
surpassing $5 billion in 1985.
70. With a population of 49 million people, England and Wales spent £266 million
(roughly $400 million at current exchange rates) on legal aid in 1984. INTERNATIONAL DI-
RECTORY OF LEGAL AID, supra note 13, at 104. England expends more than half of its legal
aid budget on civil representation. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, LEGAL AID AND ADVICE 216
(1978).
71. With a population roughly the same as the state of California, Canada spent more than
$140 million on legal aid in 1984. INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LEGAL AID, supra note
13, at 60-83. Based on the experience of the two largest provinces, it can be estimated that
about two-thirds of this sum ($95 million) is expended on civil legal aid. Several of the prov-
inces were more generous than this on a per capita basis. Id.
72. With a population of 14 million people, the Netherlands spent $76 million on legal aid
in 1983. Id. at 161. Of this sum, approximately three-quarters was expended on civil ligita-
tion. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 70, at 190.
73. With a population of eight million people, Sweden spent 212 million kroner (roughly
$40 million at current exchange rates) on legal aid in 1984. INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF
LEGAL AID, supra note 13, at 214. It is estimated that Sweden expends about two-thirds of its
legal aid budget on civil representation. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 70, at 207.
74. INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LEGAL AID, supra note 13, at 75. See also supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
75. Although demand rose more than 10% per year during the first years after the incep-
tion of a comprehensive government-funded right to counsel, by fiscal year 1982-83 the rate of
increase was down to 3.7% with only 1% growth projected for fiscal year 1983-84. 1984
COMMISSION DES SERVICES JURIDIQUES, 12TH ANNUAL REPORT 14042. This meant the
Quebec program represented 228,240 poor people in 1982-83. Id. at 142. Meanwhile, the
budget for 1983-84 was $54.6 million-less than 4% greater than 1982-83. Id. at 140, 146.
Quebec is a good benchmark for several reasons. Like California, it is highly urbanized,
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civil representation, this apparently stable budget level would equate to
something in the neighborhood of $120 million a year in California.76
This is more than four times the amount that the Legal Services Corpo-
ration presently allocates to California, and more than three times the
amount that is currently available to represent this state's poor after ad-
ding in the new Client Trust Fund Revenues.77 Still, by comparison with
this state's Medi-Cal or Medicare programs, it is a miniscule appropria-
tion. Medi-Cal and Medicare spend well over $9.5 billion a year to keep
needy and elderly Californians healthy,78 almost eighty times what it
would cost to guarantee a right to counsel for the poor.
As you can see, what we are talking about are tiny sums compared
to Medi-Cal or Medicare or most health and social programs. This poses
still another set of questions. What could be a more justifiable use of
public monies than those needed to ensure that the courts can do their
job right and afford equal justice to all? And if many nations, smaller
and often poorer than the United States or the State of California, are
willing to pay the price of equal justice, why not here?
III. CONCLUSION
If I were expected in this talk to define the present right to counsel
yet has many smaller cities and large agricultural areas. The quantity and type of legal
problems facing the low income populations in Quebec and California are quite comparable.
Quebec's eligibility standards are similar to those prevailing in California, although a higher
percentage of the Quebec population is eligible to qualify for assistance. The Quebec program
supplies about two-thirds of its services through 330 salaried attorneys who are akin to Califor-
nia's legal services lawyers. The rest of the cases are handled by compensated private counsel.
For descriptions of these features of the Quebec Province program, see M. CAPPELLETTI,
supra note 5, at 585-618; Zemans, Canada, in PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID, supra note 31, at
98-103.
76. Quebec spends roughly $4 per capita for services in civil cases. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text. If California were to spend a similar sum the budget would project to $96
million (24 million times $4). In contrast, the Legal Services Corporation and Client Trust
Fund programs are expected to supply roughly $35 million in 1985-assuming both of these
sources of funding survive.
77. The Client Trust Fund program has only recently come into existence in California,
and even more recently has begun allocating funds to legal services agencies representing the
poor. Known as IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer Trust Account Program), this program is au-
thorized by CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6212 (West Supp. 1985) and administered by the
California State Bar. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1985). The pro-
gram survived a legal challenge to its constitutionality in Carroll v. State Bar, 162 Cal. App. 3d
1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984). It is estimated the California IOLTA will generate approxi-
mately $12 million a year for civil representation of the poor when it becomes fully
operational.
78. In 1982, Medicare expended $5.985 billion in California and in 1983 Medi-Cal ex-
pended $3.557 billion in this state. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 67, at 373 (Table No.
628). By 1985, these figures are undoubtedly substantially higher.
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in civil litigation in California there would not have been much to say.
Viewed from the perspective of what already exists in most of western
civilization, our supreme court has only taken a couple of puny baby
steps with its decisions in Payne v. Superior Court and in Salas v. Cortez.
Consequently, I have chosen to look to the future and where the right to
counsel may evolve.
I realize how foolhardy it would be to attempt to predict whether or
when the California Supreme Court will establish a comprehensive right
to counsel for indigent civil litigants in this state. But I will leave you
with the words of the California Supreme Court in Martin v. Superior
Court,79 an opinion written very early in the twentieth century:
[I]mperfect as was the ancient common-law system, harsh as it
was in many of its methods and measures, it would strike one
with surprise to be credibly informed that the common-law
courts ... shut their doors upon... poor suitors .... Even
greater would be the reproach to the system of jurisprudence of
the state of California if it could be truly declared that in this
twentieth century ... it had said the same thing .... 80
That is what an earlier supreme court told us when the century was
young and the mood optimistic about twentieth century standards of jus-
tice. Seventy-eight years later, California courts are, as a practical mat-
ter, still "shut[ting] their doors upon . . . poor suitors." Now, as we
approach the sunset of the twentieth century, the question for the present
supreme court is whether this "reproach to the system of jurisprudence
of the state of California" has assumed constitutional dimensions.
But for other governmental institutions, and for the legal profession,
the question is different. It is whether this state will only respond to
constitutional directives, or whether sound public policy and common
morality should be reason enough for the legislature and the bar to erase
this reproach from our system of justice. Perhaps California society
should not depend on the courts to tell us whether minimal levels of due
process and their equal protection require us to guarantee free lawyers to
poor people in civil cases. Perhaps it is time for the legislature and the
bar and people of the state to say we, as a state, can no longer remain a
backwater of equal justice for poor people in civil cases.
79. 176 Cal. 2d 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
80. Id. at 294, 168 P. at 137.
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No matter what the supreme court may do, perhaps it is time to
follow the lead of the legislatures of so many other democracies and en-
act a statutory right to counsel in civil cases. Let us let our consciences,
not just our Constitution, be the guide.
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FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
VIEW FROM A LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
Sheldon Portman*
I have the disquieting feeling that we may be talking only to each
other here. I hope that what we have to say here will get beyond the
confines of this room, and that those of you who are not professional
defenders or legal aid people or bar people will take the message back to
your counties. I know there was some effort by myself and others in
connection with this conference to try to invite and encourage more peo-
ple from the legislative arena to come here. It is important that this
message get out for a number of reasons, some of which you have already
heard. I would like to thank the California Attorneys for Criminal Jus-
tice, the State Bar of California, the American Bar Association and the
others who have been involved in the sponsorship of this conference.
I think it is important to bring this critical problem to the attention
of our public officials because I have the feeling, as someone who is in the
trenches, that we are alone out there, that nobody is listening to us and
that we have some very vital problems that are not only affecting us and
affecting our clients, but are also affecting the system and the fairness of
the system of justice that we should all be concerned about.
When we speak of indigent defendants, we are not talking simply
about people who are poor and destitute and have no place to live or
have no money in the bank. That is the first principle that we ought to
keep in mind. We are talking about people in the criminal justice area at
least who, more and more, are being priced out of the ability to afford
private counsel.
You have heard John Van de Kamp talk about all of the needed
things lawyers have to do in order to maintain competence and assure
that they are not going to be accused or found to have committed mal-
practice later on. Well, that is fine and dandy for the lawyers who are
knowledgeable, have the skill and training and the background and the
experience. But more and more we are finding that the pool of lawyers
* Public Defender for Santa Clara County, California since 1968. Mr. Portman has
served on the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants and as Vice-
chair of the ABA Committee on Defense Services of the Criminal Justice Council. His many
published articles include: Gideon's Trumpet Blows for Misdemeanants-Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, The Decision and its Impact, 66 A.B.A. J. 1084-87 (1980), and Implementing the Right to
Counsel in State Criminal Cases (co-authored by Professor N. Lefstein). Mr. Portman is the
current chair of the ABA's Bar Information Program to improve funding for indigent defense
services in criminal cases.
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out there who have this knowledge and experience and background is
becoming smaller and smaller and smaller. And the result of that, by the
law of supply and demand, is that more and more of our middle-class
people forget about the poor and the destitute-more and more of our
middle-class people themselves are unable financially to afford counsel in
criminal cases, let alone civil matters.
The result is that more and more of the people in the middle-class
sector are being forced upon understaffed, overworked public defenders
or upon assigned counsel who simply have no background, who are
poorly paid, who are unskilled, who are inexperienced.
Now, what is the effect of that? Not only does it affect the individ-
ual client and leave that person in the situation of being wrongfully con-
victed or having their rights abused, but it also affects the entire criminal
justice system in the process. While we hear all kinds of complaints these
days about lawyers who abuse the system, who conduct voir dire unnec-
essarily, who cause delay, who file unnecessary motions and so on and so
forth, very little thought is being given to the competence, the skill, the
experience and the expertise that is required.
When I began the practice of criminal law nearly thirty years ago, it
was a simple matter to handle the criminal case. I will never forget the
experience of going to the police station to interview a client, who was
then being interrogated, and being told by the officer: "Wait until we're
done talking to him and then you can talk to him."
Well, in the meantime we have had Miranda v. Arizona,' we have
had Mapp v. Ohio2 and we have had a raft of other constitutional deci-
sions. And along with that we have had all of these other statutes com-
ing down the pike from our state legislature, especially in the last five or
six years, which have simply compounded the practice of criminal law.3
They have made it a field that the State Bar recognizes as a specialty and
that requires a high degree of technical skill and expertise.
Now, what about that indigent population out there? Do those of
you who are involved in the funding process realize that ninety percent of
the people charged with felonies in our superior courts are indigent; that
roughly about forty and maybe even fifty percent of those charged in the
municipal courts with misdemeanors are indigent; and that a tremendous
segment of our criminal justice population is being represented by either
overworked, understaffed public defenders or unskilled, untrained ap-
pointed private counsel? Is there any wonder at the fact, given the com-
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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plexity of today's criminal law process, that we have all of these appeals
going on charging incompetence of counsel?4
Certainly there are many inappropriate charges against competent,
skilled lawyers. But when you consider that most of the lawyers that are
working out there, except for a handful of public defenders who, again,
are overworked and understaffed, who do not have the support that they
need with their support services and investigation and clerical staff and
so forth, who are burning out, who are turning over year after year in our
defender offices over the last several years as a result of Proposition 13
and as a result of all this new legislation that is coming down the pike-is
it any wonder that we have this proliferation of malpractice claims?
Is it any wonder that the appellate courts are begging the Governor
not to cut the State Public Defender Office because of the proliferation of
issues that are coming up all the time, simply because trial counsel does
not have the expertise, lacks the skill and lacks the ability to do all of the
things that John Van de Kamp listed before that should be done by a
competent criminal lawyer in practicing criminal law in our courts?
It was Justice Brandeis who put it most aptly when he said: "A
judge rarely performs his function adequately unless the case before him
is adequately presented." I venture to say that in as many as fifty percent
of the criminal cases that are being presented in our courts-and I think
that is a modest estimate-the defenses are not being adequately
presented. And this is causing reversals. It is causing appellate litiga-
tion. It is causing an enormous expense, not just to the counties, but on
the state level as well.
And so we have the Governor cutting back on the State Public De-
fender Office, but by the same token pouring another five million dollars
into the cost of appointed private counsel on appeal in order to handle
this raft of appeals that are being generated to the appellate courts from
the trial courts because of the inadequacy of trial counsel.
Let us look at the different types of systems that we have by which
we deliver this service that we are providing, this inadequate service.
Then let us talk about some current problems, and then let me try to
wind this up by a specific recommendation that I hope this group will
consider.
First of all, we have the traditional public defender system, of which
I know you are all very much aware. You know that the public defender
4. See, e.g., People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979);
People v. Haynes, 104 Cal. App. 3d 118, 164 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980); People v. Lower, 100 Cal.
App. 3d 144, 161 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1979).
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system started here in California. And we in San Jose take pride in hav-
ing just discovered that the entire public defender movement in this
country was founded by California's first woman lawyer in San Jose in
1878. A woman, mind you-who had to get the law changed to permit
women to practice law-who, after her first few years of practice, con-
ceived of this novel idea: that since public prosecutors are paid and
skilled, the lawyers assigned to defend the indigent-who were not paid
at that time-ought to be paid as well; and that there ought to be an
office, an office of county public defender. And she went on over the next
two decades. Her name was Clara Shortridge Foltz. You probably never
heard of her. I didn't until just a few months ago.
She went on over the next two decades to put together a model de-
fender bill. In 1914, the first public defender office was established in Los
Angeles. And in 1921, when she was in her seventies, her legislation was
adopted by the California Legislature and serves as the model upon
which public defender offices are formed in this state.5
The public defender office concept has been a good one and has
drawn all kinds of praise, as has been indicated in the very fine syllabus
that has been prepared for this conference. If you look toward the end of
this booklet, you will find a report that was prepared by the State Bar
Standing Committee on indigent defense.
This State Bar report was prepared by a committee and a staff that
was not made up primarily of public defenders. There were a few, but
most were private lawyers. This report talks in glowing terms about the
public defender system as being universally praised, as providing a high
degree of quality representation, as generally providing the most cost-
effective representation, and as best able to assure training and the kind
of appearance that makes attorneys most effective. It also goes on to say
it has become a repository of collective experience, knowledge, dedica-
tion to criminal justice, and so on and so forth, and ending up with the
statement as being the best method in a densely populated area for pro-
viding high quality services at a predictable cost. Glowing phrases.
Wonderful.
Well, if I asked the public defenders who are here amongst us, I am
sure that they could get up here and tell you about all of the horrendous
things that have been happening in public defenders offices ever since
Proposition 13. It was bad before. It is far worse since. For example,
since the adoption of Proposition 13, Alameda County lost sixteen per-
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 27700-27712 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
cent of its staff in a three-year period, while in the same three-year period
its case load went up thirty-eight percent.
On top of that, we got the Death Penalty Initiative,6 which, accord-
ing to the Public Defenders Association, would require an addition of
twenty-five percent of the staffing of every public defender office in this
state in order to keep up with the work.
And then on top of that, we got the Determinate Sentencing Law,7
and we got the drunk driving law,8 and we got the serious felony9 and the
rape laws.10 And we got all of this horrendous state legislation on a
yearly, almost monthly, basis. And there we are being cut to the bone
and beyond the bone, having to go and beg our supervisors not to cut.
In Los Angeles, what do they do? They cut $1.1 million from the
Los Angeles County Public Defender's budget and they gave it to private
counsel on the theory that they were going to save money in a contract
system. What happened there? They ended up spending an additional
$400,000 in addition to the $1.1 million that was cut from the public
defender's budget.
That is what has been happening to our public defender system in
this state. Public defenders, the system, the idea, the ideal of Clara Foltz
back a hundred years ago, was a great idea. But our recent experiences
indicate that we are having many, many problems.
What about the court-appointed system? There are two aspects of
that. One is the old ad hoe system where judges make these appoint-
ments on an individual case basis. Now, we see what is going on in the
County of Los Angeles. Those of you who are from that county can tell
us about the scandal, the expos6 involving a certain handful of appar-
ently favorite lawyers-at least that is the suggestion-getting all these
appointments, yet building up in six figures the fees that they are earning
and giving the impression to the public that, look, we are spending lots of
money for these indigent defendants.
What are they complaining about? Well, the ad hoc system, as
proven in Los Angeles, is not working out too well. They have a great
public defender system, but somebody got the bright idea on the Board of
Supervisors a few years ago that we can save money by cutting back on
the defender and going to a contract-bid system, giving more money to
private lawyers.
6. CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 27 (West 1983).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1985).
8. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153 (West Supp. 1985).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1985).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261-264.1 (West Supp. 1985).
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Well, that is the other type of system that we have. The contract-
bid system. And under that system, which has been very appealing to a
lot of county types, the theory is that we are going to save a lot of money
because there are a lot of hungry young lawyers out there and they are
willing to take these cases for less.
San Diego County is the perfect example of what went on. In 1978,
San Diego, which has fought the public defender system and resisted it
for years and years, finally decided that they were going to set up this
contract-bid system and have contracts let out to all these hungry young
lawyers. And for $62 a case, you are going to get all these good lawyers
to handle these cases, and we do not have to worry about it.
What happened? In three years' time the cost of defense in San Di-
ego County went from four million to seven million dollars. They had
what we are very familiar with in the defense armament industry; they
had cost overruns. And so the lure of the low price and the low bid that
they started out with exploded in their faces. And now, belatedly, they
are starting in San Diego to move into the public defender system.
Now, the State Bar minces no words in criticizing the contract-bid
system as the wrong way to go, saying that it is ill-conceived, that it often
appears to compromise the duties and obligations of advocacy. It dis-
rupts the bar. It creates political dissension, chaos that can often rule for
several months as these annual contracts are negotiated and renegotiated.
So the lure of the contract-bid system is out. It has been proven a mis-
conception and a false lure. The systems that we have in California, in
addition to the two that I mentioned, involve a panel of lawyers that is
set up by an administrator in which the lawyers are categorized and the
fees are administered by a county official or by a bar association, which
has a contract-those ha ,e worked out fairly well and helped in match-
ing the lawyers to the skill or the complexity of the case.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
VIEW FROM THE STATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER
Frank 0. Bell, Jr.*
In preparing my remarks today, I thought it would be helpful to
describe to you how the system that is presently in place works, what the
State Public Defender's role in that system is and to suggest to you that
the real question, in terms of funding the representation of indigents on
appeal, is finding the proper balance between the institutional defender,
which is represented by the State Public Defender in this state, and the
input that private lawyers skilled in the criminal law can have in the
criminal justice system.
In my twelve years of service in the federal public defender system
and in my continued involvement in the criminal justice system over al-
most the entire eighteen years of my legal career, it seems evident that at
least on the appellate level, and probably to some extent on the trial level,
there must continue to be a significant involvement of private appointed
counsel.
There is a lot to be gained by looking at the institutional defender in
the sense that there can be developed a group of lawyers who have spe-
cific skills and specific expertise, who are appellate specialists-for exam-
ple, as they are in our office-and who provide an extremely high level of
representation.
In fact, they set the standard in my judgment. I am proud to say
that on behalf of my office. They set the standard for quality appellate
representation in the State of California. At the same time there are
certain evils in having only an institutional defender. We need a fresh
approach. We need the independence of the individual lawyers who are
ready, willing and able to accept court-appointed representation in indi-
gent cases.
In the State of California, according to the Judicial Council, we can
expect approximately 6000 appeals which will require appointed lawyers.
* California State Public Defender. An 18-year veteran of the criminal justice system,
Mr. Bell spent two years as State Deputy Attorney General in the Criminal Division in the
Office of the Attorney General and a total of four years in private practice conducting civil and
criminal trial and appellate litigation in state and federal courts. For 12 years he served as
Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of California, where he
conducted federal criminal and white collar trial and appellate litigation.
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We have in place, in this system, what Mr. Portman referred to as a
"mixed" system of representation.
The State Public Defender, on the one hand, represents a certain
percentage, a certain number, of those appellants. Private appointed
counsel represent the great bulk of those appellants. This has, in fact,
been the case since the very institution of the State Public Defender.
The number of persons represented by the State Public Defender has
changed from time to time, based on the funding for the office. But the
State Public Defender has never handled more than approximately thirty
to forty percent of the total number of appellants. The remaining appel-
lants have been represented by private appointed counsel.
I would like to discuss what we, the State Public Defender, do in
terms of two concepts. The first is the actual work that we do in the
cases, including our caseload or workload problems or responsibilities;
and the second is our non-case responsibilities. In the area of our
caseload, of course, we have a number of different kinds and seriousness,
a mix of kinds and seriousness, of cases within the system. Obviously,
the most serious, the most sensitive, are death penalty cases. After you
address the issue of the death penalty, you have, in my judgment, clearly
the second most serious case, in which your client has received the sen-
tence of life without the possibility of parole.
After that it becomes a question of definition in terms of the serious-
ness of the case. You can look at it in terms of the serious issues it
presents. You can look at it in terms of the length of the record and the
difficulty of getting a private appointed lawyer to take a substantial case
with a long record involving a great development of time.
The court system has wrestled with that problem by attempting to
categorize the seriousness of a case. Quite recently, as of July 1, 1984,
they adopted a way of classifying cases. They classified, after death pen-
alty cases, the most serious cases in the category of fifteen years to life,
including life without parole; secondly, those cases where the sentences
run between five years and fifteen years; and in the third category, they
group cases where the sentence runs from probation to five years.
There are other considerations that need to be addressed in terms of
selection of the counsel to handle those cases. But those are the rough
categories of seriousness of the cases in the appellate system.
Now, in a "mixed" system of representation, it presumes that the
institutional defender, the State Public Defender, will not handle 100%
of the cases. Once you make that assumption, then you come to a very
difficult problem; a problem that is not easily resolved and a problem I do
not have a ready answer for. If it is less than 100%, what percent of the
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cases should the institutional defender handle? Throughout our United
States, where we have a variety of appellate defender offices, the decision
as to what percentage of the cases that the appellate defender handles can
be found to vary from state to state.
For example, in the State of Michigan, it is expressed as "not... less
than 25% of the.. .appellate cases... of this state."1 The standard does
not speak to the particular districts in the state, but it speaks about the
overall appellate caseload. The same kinds of considerations apply here
in the State of California.
In terms of our death penalty work, we have attempted to make a
decision based on a number of factors. It seems to me these are the fac-
tors that must be weighed in determining, in whatever system which is
considering installation of an institutional defender, how many cases or
what the workload of that institutional defender should be.
For example, if you have a "mixed" system, you certainly must con-
sider the availability or the willingness-availability and willingness be-
ing equated in my mind-of private lawyers willing to take on court
appointed cases. The second consideration, after you have arrived at the
number of lawyers who are willing to take on the cases, it seems to me, is
the level of competence of those lawyers. In other words, as the cases
become more serious, do you have enough private lawyers who are suffi-
ciently competent, skilled and experienced to provide quality representa-
tion to their clients?
On the other hand, you have to look at the staffing of the institu-
tional defender itself. And you have to look at the experience level, the
competence of that staff, the caseload standard, the workload of an indi-
vidual lawyer in that office and how many cases that lawyer can handle.
The problem of caseload standard for lawyers is one of the most compli-
cated problems in the defender system. Everyone has proposed solutions
to the problem, but in my opinion no single solution is really an adequate
one. That is an art, in terms of judging the caseload standards that apply
to a particular lawyer, and many, many factors have to be taken into
consideration in judging that.
You have to look at the complexity of the particular case. You have
to look at whether or not the case falls in the category of the most serious
case. For example, one should consider a life without parole case, which
has a number of serious issues which are presented only in those cases,
because they involve charges of special circumstances.
Or you look at the other question likely to be present in the area of a
1. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.716(c) (West 1982).
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case which is likely to fall into the sentencing category, fifteen years to
life. For example, many of those cases are homicides and sex cases with
multiple consecutive sentences. You are likely to find great numbers of
those cases in that fifteen year to life category, and those cases tend to be
complex or noncomplex, depending upon the kinds of issues that often
arise.
You have to look at what you want the institutional defender to do
in terms of his total case responsibility. For example, in the State of
California, the State Public Defender serves not only the supreme court,
in death penalty cases, but it also serves the courts of appeal.
And there has to be a weighing of the responsibility and the ability
to provide services to the various courts. It serves not only the supreme
court and the courts of appeal, but it serves now five of the six districts
within the State of California. The State Public Defender does not, at the
present time, provide service to the fourth district. That service is pro-
vided by Appellate Defenders, Incorporated, a nonprofit corporation
which provides services for a number of appellants in that district.
You have to look also at the non-case responsibility of your institu-
tional defender. For example, in our situation we provide-and I will
discuss these in a moment-an amicus program where we file briefs on
legal issues in the courts of appeal and the California Supreme Court
where we have no direct responsibility for representing the defendant in
that case.
We feel that we have a function in training the private appointed
lawyers who are interested in taking appointment in order to raise the
general level of representation. For every hour we spend working on an
amicus matter or in training a private lawyer, we have one hour less, of
course, to spend on our own case responsibilities.
We have a brief bank that we make available to private lawyers so
that they can shortcut their research, use it to begin their research and
find the latest of our work product in our office, so that perhaps the cost
of providing private representation can be kept as low as possible, and
also to save those lawyers time and to give them direction in terms of the
legal issues presented in those cases.
We also have a legislative function, and we take into account certain
historical facts in terms of the level of representation we have provided.
This is an area where-if I am correct-the latest projection is that there
are approximately thirty death verdicts returned in California every year.
You must weigh these kinds of considerations against the total
caseload. And when we did that, we came up with ten cases our office
was prepared to provide representation in, or believed we could provide
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representation in, during any given fiscal year. In other words, we could
take on ten new death penalty cases, we had hoped, during the year 1984-
85.
We also offer certain ad hoe consultation and attorney-of-the-day
service to trial and appellate lawyers handling death penalty cases. And
we maintain, in cooperation with the California Appellate Project (which
Michael Millman will speak about in a few moments), a death penalty
index of death penalty issues, relevant authorities and briefs, and death
penalty information for the use of lawyers who are providing representa-
tion in death penalty cases.
We have the problem of a whole bunch of other cases, after we
talked about those death penalty cases; and, we have definitely tried to
prioritize those cases in terms of our involvement of time and effort. We
have similar caseload considerations as to those cases. I believe that
although the State Public Defender is authorized to represent individuals
in a number of cases, our substantial involvement ought to be in criminal
appellate and writ matters. We have tried to stay away from such mat-
ters as conservatorships and parental rights matters, mentally disordered
sex offender proceedings and those matters involving persons committed
by reason of their insanity. Instead, we have tried to concentrate on
criminal appeals and writs.
In our non-case work, what we do besides the cases themselves, is
our amicus program. We will file a number of amicus briefs in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, and in some limited number of cases in the Cali-
fornia courts of appeal, for the benefit of a present client whose case has
not reached that high court yet, or for the benefit of a client or a potential
client that we are likely to have in the near future. We will also file an
amicus brief where the issue involved in that case has a broad impact in
the appellate caseload of the State of California and is likely to impact on
a number of appeals that will be coming up in the future.
We have a training function that we provide. The State Public De-
fender is planning to have a training program that will be offered in three
areas of the State of California: in Sacramento, San Francisco and Los
Angeles, a one-day seminar sometime in late April or early May of this
year.
We have an attorney-of-the-day consultation number where private
lawyers who are doing appointed appellate work can call our office and
get the benefit of our expertise. We offer a number of publications in the
field, including a criminal appeals manual, a supreme court report, a de-
terminate sentencing law manual and the death penalty index that I pre-
viously referred to, as well as our brief bank, where any private lawyer
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who is handling appointed cases can either purchase microfiche of the
briefs in that bank or can come to our office and examine the actual brief
in order to aid in the research.
Along with that system there will be instituted, as of January 1 of
this year, a system of contract administrators which is intendedito raise
the level of representation provided by private lawyers. Mr. Millman's
program, California Appellate Project, is a version of that which is being
used in the California Supreme Court. It is also in place in other
districts.
The court of appeal will contract with an administrator who will
classify lawyers, bring them into the system and assess their qualifica-
tions to make sure that only qualified lawyers are appointed to represent
people. They will match those lawyers to the individual cases to make
sure that only lawyers with sufficient experience and skill represent peo-
ple in the more serious cases. They will provide consultation on issues
and procedures of law to shortcut the work required, if possible, and will
make recommendations as to the further participation of the court of
appeal, which has the ultimate responsibility of providing counsel in the
case.
How is this system going to work in the future? That remains to be
seen. It has already been touched on that in the Governor's budget,
which was sent to the legislature this year, the cost of providing counsel
to 6000 indigents will be approximately $13.9 million. This is a $5 mil-
lion increase over previous budgeted amounts.
The cost of providing a loan to the contracted administrator is esti-
mated to be $4.9 million. I understand $780,000 of that is allocated for
the California Appellate Project, of which Mr. Millman is the Executive
Director. And the cost of providing the actual lawyers to appellants in
the state is considered to be approximately $8.6 million, which works out
to approximately $1333 per case, as I figure, spread out over the 6000
cases.
I think the State of California is in the process of change. It is in the
process of experimentation. How these programs will work in the future
will remain to be seen, and I, like you, will be following them with great
interest.
Thank you very much.
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FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
VIEW FROM THE PRIVATE BAR
Patricia D. Phillips*
Thank you. Good morning, everyone.
It looks as though again I am the minority person here. It appears
that each of my colleagues on the panel has a background in criminal
law. Throughout my career, I have been a civil lawyer, although I did
have one criminal law case. That one was enough. It went all the way to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
The underlying premise of my remarks, which fortunately was vali-
dated by Justice Johnson today, is that in certain civil cases, indigent
individuals have a right to representation without charge. Obviously, the
real issue is whether the lawyers in those civil cases can be compelled to
accept those appointments without compensation from any source
whatsoever.
That issue is not one which I intend to resolve here today. But I will
talk with you about what the organized bar has done, not just in response
to Yarbrough I or Payne,2 but what we in Los Angeles County have done
over many years to provide pro bono services for indigent people in our
area.
I am assuming that-although most of the cases with which we are
familiar have involved appointments in civil matters where the client was
jailed-the jailed civil litigant has no more of a right to appointed coun-
sel than those civil litigants who are not in jail. Some have taken the
equation one step further and have said that if persons sued as defendants
in civil cases have a constitutional right to counsel, then there seems little
reason to deny the right to persons who are indigent and wish to sue as
plaintiffs in civil cases. I am not sure that this step is yet justified, but I
think that my remarks apply in any event.
I would like to discuss first a phenomenon which may be obvious,
but which certainly bears emphasis. Over the years that I have been in-
* Partner, Hufstedler, Miller, Carlson & Beardsley, Los Angeles. Ms. Phillips special-
izes in civil litigation and family law. She is currently President of the Los Angeles County
Bar Association and a member of the Family Law Sections of the Los Angeles County Bar, the
State Bar of California and the ABA. She has served as Chair of the Committee of Bar Exam-
iners of the State Bar of California and has lectured for Continuing Education of the Bar, Los
Angeles County Bar Continuing Education/Rutter Group and Bridging the Gap programs.
1. Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
2. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
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volved with the organized bar, there is no issue which, in my view, has
evoked such an immediate, vocal and consistent response by members of
the bar as has the issue of the mandated provision of uncompensated
legal services for the benefit of indigent civil litigants. Lawyers have been
united in opposing the concept of mandatory pro bono legal services for
the indigent civil litigant as though we are all peas out of the same pod.
Indeed, even opposition to the concept of mandatory pro bono legal serv-
ices in criminal matters, for years a topic of discussion, has not so united
the bar.
So why is this? Are we all a bunch of avaricious, self-centered peo-
ple who are unwilling to make available the expertise which we have so
painstakingly acquired in becoming and being successful lawyers? I do
not think so.
I believe that almost without exception, you will find that the 90,000
lawyers of this state are doing work for free in one way or another-
perhaps not in an organized project or for folks who can be classified as
truly indigent-but California lawyers are contributing in an informal
and enlightened way. I would like to share with you some of the many
responses to the need, indeed demand, for pro bono services that the law-
yers of Los Angeles County have developed.
As a result of the cutback in funding of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion in 1982, many lawyers developed a new interest in the extent to
which the private bar was involved in providing pro bono services, and
the extent to which it must become further involved. The Los Angeles
County Bar Association appointed a two person committee3 to look into
the issue of the funding of legal services, and particularly, to work with
recognized pro bono providers to identify and coordinate the work of all
the different groups in Los Angeles County. Just recently, in December
1984, our bar association published a current directory of pro bono serv-
ices available throughout our large county.4 And I can tell you there are
a lot of pro bono organizations in Los Angeles County.
The range of groups in which the volunteer lawyer may become in-
volved in Los Angeles County is very broad. Some groups focus their
efforts generally on providing legal services for the poor; others focus on
providing services for specific client groups, such as the elderly or the
disabled. Other volunteers attempt to aid in easing the burden on courts
and administrative hearing agencies by acting as mediators and judges
pro tem. Participation in some programs provides training and opportu-
3. The committee consisted of attorneys William Kurlander and Charles Palmer.
4. Copies of this directory can be obtained by writing: The Los Angeles County Bar
Association, P.O. Box 55020, Los Angeles, CA 90055.
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nities which can help lawyers to expand their practices, while other pro-
grams help attorneys perfect their lawyering skills. Many areas of law in
which services are rendered require some familiarity with particular
fields of law in addition to the good intention to provide pro bono legal
services.
The Los Angeles County Bar Association, along with the Beverly
Hills Bar, for many years has cosponsored a public interest law firm
called "Public Counsel." Public Counsel serves, in large part, as an
agency for bringing together attorneys who want to provide, and clients
who require, legal services. This service is offered in a variety of ways.
The most widely based is the Volunteer Legal Services Project which is
serviced with the cooperation of one of the largest and most respected
legal aid firms in the country, the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.
There, litigators represent clients in matters of real property, fraud, con-
sumer disputes, landlord-tenant problems and uninsured torts.
One project that does not require the services of litigators is our
Community and Charitable Organization Counseling Project, which,
through Public Counsel, is sponsored by two of our bar association sub-
stantive law sections. Here, tax and corporate advice is provided to qual-
ifying organizations by members of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association's Taxation Section and Business and Corporate Law Section.
Often you will find a willing, eager young attorney ready to give his
or her time, but who may lack the requisite experience. He or she "has
the will, but not the way." Through a vehicle called "Public Counsel-
ors," experienced trial attorneys provide supervision and backup to one
or two younger lawyers from small firms or to those lawyers who are solo
practitioners. This enables less experienced lawyers to handle cases
through Public Counsel's Volunteer Legal Services Project. The Los An-
gles County Bar Association Trial Lawyers Section is specifically in-
volved in providing experienced lawyers for this task.
Various panels of volunteer attorneys which focus on specific areas
of the law have been established, including a probate panel; conservator-
ship and guardianship panels; bankruptcy, unemployment, family law,
student rights and nursing home panels; legal referral, the elderly, a hos-
pice committee, a pro se tax program, an indigent taxpayer program and
a paternity pro bono panel. These are all projects which have success-
fully solicited thousands of Los Angeles County lawyers and brought
them together with the needy. Our Domestic Violence Project, Immigra-
tion Legal Assistance Project, and Volunteers in Parole Program also
provide hundreds of lawyers free of charge to those affected in these ar-
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eas. In addition, volunteer lawyers sit as judges pro tem in family law
and in workers' compensation matters.
We provide mediation services in family law disputes, and counsel-
ing in child and spousal abuse programs. Perhaps our most well-known
mediation program is the Neighborhood Justice Center, a program estab-
lished many years ago by the Los Angeles County Bar Association as an
alternative dispute resolution program, where people in conflict are
brought together and, through mediation, helped to resolve their
problems without reference to the expensive and overcrowded court sys-
tem. The Neighborhood Justice Project has won awards from the Amer-
ican Bar Association and others for the service it provides.
Within a few weeks, a special committee5 which I appointed just this
year, the "Ad Hoc Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee," will sub-
mit its proposals for legislation to establish a statewide alternative dis-
pute resolution program to the Los Angeles County Bar Association
trustees. I anticipate that the trustees will adopt the program and seek
implementation of it by legislation.' This program will provide an easy
and inexpensive method of dispute resolution outside the cumbersome
and slow processes of the court.
In addition, the Los Angeles County Bar Association has been
asked by the California Supreme Court to establish a procedure for
matching counsel with clients in indigent criminal appeals. It is a terrifi-
cally large and expensive job which may require as much as $200,000 in
seed money. I expect that proposal will be before our Board of Trustees
shortly.
These few projects are by no means all of those which constitute the
response of the legal profession to the need to provide pro bono and low-
cost legal services to the poor in the Los Angeles County area. Several of
our affiliate organizations have themselves sponsored projects of great
benefit to the community, including the Harriet Buhai Family Law pro-
ject, which is sponsored by the Women Lawyers Association of Los An-
geles and the Black Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles. This
project provides a mechanism for bringing legal advice to indigents with
family law problems.
Several of the bar associations including, of course, the Los Angeles
5. This committee is co-chaired by a former president of the Santa Monica Bar, who is
currently a trustee of the Los Angeles County Bar Association, and by a member of the Cali-
fornia State Bar Board of Governors.
6. Since these remarks were given, the trustees of the Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
tion have voted to sponsor the legislation, Senate Bill 1215 carried by Sen. John Garamendi.
Cal. S.B. 1215, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
County Bar, have lawyer referral and informational services which pro-
vide clients with free counseling to help them to focus on what they re-
ally need in terms of legal services.
All of these organizations are fine. They are identified; they have
phone numbers. And surely they must have numerous potential deserv-
ing clients seeking legal redress for a variety of legal problems.
But that skirts a principal question. What has the private bar done
to provide lawyers to meet the demand? Traditionally, the medium to
large size firms have committed a percentage of their lawyers' time to pro
bono matters. This has been the custom for years. But all of a sudden,
and indeed almost concurrently with the cutback in government funding
for legal services, the law firms began a cutback of their own. Well, what
happened? What happened was the recession. Attorneys' bills were put
on the back burner; lawyers' bills began to take an even lower priority
than doctors' bills, and doctors' bills at least were insured against.
And just prior to the cutback in the legal services budget, which in
turn led to the need for an even greater commitment to pro bono work on
the part of the private bar, the overhead expenses of law firms peaked.
Office space in the urban centers of our state rose from eight to nine
dollars a square foot per year to twenty-five to thirty dollars or more per
square foot per year.
The firms, all sizes, began to feel the pinch and began to look more
closely at their associates' billable hours. Instead of asking for 1500 to
1600 hours per year, we began looking for 1800 to 2000 billable hours per
year.
Even my firm, which for thirty years has been known for its pro
bono commitment, began to rein in our young lawyers-not by limiting
their nonbillable time, but by increasing the expectation for billable time.
Thus, in most cases, the individual lawyer was left to decide whether to
stay on track for partnership by putting in the expected billable time,
whether to give time to indigents, or whether to devote time to something
that, for lawyers, often takes a backseat-his or her own family. We
found that the choice was not hard for some of these young lawyers. The
public spirited youngsters just coming out of school in the 1960's and
1970's had been replaced by a more conservative group of young lawyers,
more attuned to their own economic survival than those in the past.
Even so, most professionals in the legal service field question the
efficiency of mandatory pro bono services for each and every lawyer in
this state. After all, as with any other aspect of the practice of law, some
expertise, as well as devotion to the task, is necessary to the success of the
particular representation.
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Not each and every lawyer has that expertise and the Trustees of the
Los Angeles County Bar Association have, in the past, taken the position
that the most expedient and efficient way of providing the necessary pro
bono services is through its organized projects which I have described
above. Funding and the matching of attorney with client through one
centrally located source has proven to be a much more efficient way of
providing legal services for the poor or indigent.
The list of activities I have provided you, the thousands of lawyers
who volunteer their time in difficult and time consuming tasks, under-
scores the commitment of the California Bar generally to aid in provid-
ing these services.
However, the obligation framed by the constitutional imperative we
are discussing today is not the obligation of lawyers only, but of society
as a whole. Something which is often overlooked, but should not be, is
that the obligation to provide the wherewithal to meet that constitutional
imperative is not exclusively that of lawyers. To the extent that society
mandates legal services for the poor and the indigent, it should become
the concern of all segments of society, not just lawyers. To urge other-
wise would be similar to placing the full burden on the medical profes-
sion of supplying medical services to the poor and indigent, or the sole
responsibility on farmers for feeding the poor. The legal rights and needs
of the poor are a societal problem and responsibility.
Just as doctors did not invent diseased people neither did lawyers
invent the poor with their particular legal problems. The organized bar
is pleased to participate with the rest of society in helping to alleviate
these societal problems. But we cannot do it alone and we should not be
expected to do it alone.
I believe that this realization is what has caused the profession to sit
up and take notice of, indeed, if not vehemently oppose, the concept that
lawyers only bear the entire cost of providing these constitutionally man-
dated legal services to the indigent.
I thank you for allowing me to be with you today. And I am sorry
that I will be unable to stay with you for the rest of the program, which I
would like very much to do. As it happens, on the agenda of the Board
of Trustees today is the issue of support for the identical legislation that
was proposed and passed by the legislature last year,' but which the Gov-
ernor vetoed, having to do with the Yarbrough problem; that is, the state
funding for appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants. Of course, the
7. Cal. S.B. 2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (1984) (vetoed September 28, 1984).
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bill now pending has a cap of a million dollars.8 So it is one that not
everybody is in support of anyway. But in any event, I must get back to
Los Angeles, and I thank you for your attention.




FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
CAPITAL CASES
Michael G. Millman*
I want to talk about capital cases, primarily on the appellate level,
and to some degree on the trial level. In the short time I have, I want to
give you some statistical information, because I think you will see that
numbers become important in any analysis of capital cases.'
The system we have is already on overload, which has significance in
terms of the representation we are considering. For your information,
there are now more than 160 people on death row in California.' The
rate of death judgments is running between thirty to forty per year,
which means that the number of people on death row increases every
year.' California is now in third place among the states, and if the
number of death sentences rendered continues at the present rate, we will
soon have more people on death row than any state in the country.4
On the trial level, as of January of 1984, there were approximately
325 capital cases pending in the trial courts around the state.5 That is an
enormous number of cases. When I talk to people in Colorado, they talk
about their one or two pending capital cases. They have no concept of
325 or-at one point-400 pending cases.
* Executive Director, California Appellate Project (CAP). Mr. Millman has served as
Assistant Public Defender for Alameda County, visiting lecturer at Stanford Law School and
member of the Board of Directors of the Alameda County Bar Association. From 1976-1984,
he was a Deputy State Public Defender and for most of that time was Statewide Death Penalty
Coordinator for that office. Mr. Millman is the outgoing President of California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice in 1984 and is the editor of the California Death Penalty Manual.
1. The statistical information cited by Mr. Millman in his remarks was derived from
numerous sources and unpublished documents accessible to him in his capacity as Executive
Director of California Appellate Project. Verification of or additional information regarding
the statistics discussed herein may be obtained by writing: California Appellate Project, 345
Franklin Street, San Francisco, California 94102.
2. A recent statistical profile of inmates on California's Death Row revealed that 167
inmates are currently awaiting execution. L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
3. California Supreme Court Justice Joseph R. Grodin recently remarked that reviewing
this number of capital cases also greatly burdens the state supreme court:
[S]o long as the number of death penalty judgments remains at its present level-
between 30 and 40 per year-and so long as all these judgments come directly to the
Supreme Court for initial review, the court's task with respect to death penalty cases
will remain a formidable one.
Grodin ... and Easy Answers Don't Exist, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 4, col. 5.
4. A recent statistical profile of death sentences in the United States indicated that as of
August 1, 1985, Texas had 201 inmates on its Death Row, Florida had 221 such inmates, and
California had 167 such inmates. L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
5. As of January, 1985, there were 372 capital cases pending in California trial courts.
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There is a correlation between the death judgments and capital fil-
ings. We have been able to predict fairly consistently that the correlation
will be ten percent; that is, for every 100 cases charged as capital, one or
two years later there will be 10 death judgments.
We could see in 1983 that the number of capital cases in the trial
courts was beginning to decline for the first time-from 400 cases down
to 325 cases. Thus, it was predictable that the number of death judg-
ments last year would be the lowest it has been in several years. There
were 20 death judgments in 1979, 24 in 1980, 40 in 1981, 39 in 1982 and
37 in 1983. Last year, the number of death judgments was down to 29.
In the capital arena, we are talking almost entirely about indigent
defendants. Of the 160 people on death row, exactly three have been able
to retain their own counsel. The State Public Defender represents 39
appellants, the California Appellate Project represents 2 defendants,
while the remaining 111 people have to be represented by appointed pri-
vate counsel.
The problem then becomes: How do we find qualified lawyers who
are willing to take these cases? Part of the problem has been financial.
Until 1981, the California Supreme Court budget provided a grand total
of $1400 for represeiltation on an automatic appeal, and that included
expenses. Since an automatic appeal can take between 700 and 1000
hours of attorney time, and sometimes more, lawyers stood to net one
dollar per hour or less. That changed dramatically in 1981, when the
Judicial Council of California promulgated informal guidelines providing
a rate of compensation at forty dollars per allowable hour and additional
compensation for expenses. The Judicial Council also provided for in-
terim fee applications, which becomes incredibly important when a case
goes on for two or three years. Now a lawyer can bill every sixty days
and receive interim compensation.
In 1984, the Judicial Council increased the compensation level for
automatic appeals to sixty dollars per allowable hour.6 Much of the fi-
nancial impediment to counsel coming forward has been alleviated by
these increases. An hourly rate of sixty dollars is still small compared to
what experienced counsel will charge their clients; but, it is a big
improvement.
But the problem is not merely financial. The problem is also histori-
cal. California has never really had an appellate bar on the same scale as
its trial bar. We do not have a large array of appellate lawyers who are
6. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, PAYMENT GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTED
COUNSEL REPRESENTING INDIGENT CRIMINAL APPELLANTS IN THE CALIFORNIA APPEL-
LATE COURTS (1984).
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qualified to take these cases. The inadequacy was such that in 1976, the
State Public Defender Office was established to provide a much higher
standard of representation and, as Frank Bell indicated, to set the stan-
dard for appellate representation in the state.
That is why, in my opinion, the cutback of the State Public De-
fender Office last year was so unfortunate. We were beginning to see the
fruits of having a trained group of appellate lawyers. Most people will
agree that the quality of representation provided by the state office has
been significantly higher than that previously afforded indigent
defendants.
I would estimate that in roughly twenty percent of the present death
penalty appeals, serious problems exist regarding the adequacy of repre-
sentation afforded. We are talking about some lawyers who simply miss
appellate issues of which they are not aware. We are talking about other
lawyers who brief those issues, but do so inadequately. Or, most re-
cently, we are talking about lawyers who simply do not bother to file a
brief at all, as in one recent case in which the California Supreme Court
finally had to remove counsel from the case.7 If that twenty percent esti-
mate is remotely correct, we are talking about twenty-five to thirty cases
per year in which the representation being provided is substandard. That
has to be a great concern to all of us in the system.
I conducted a quick survey of representation in capital cases in the
trial courts, about which I have less direct information. I do not really
have the time to tell you all that I learned. But I can tell you that people
who returned our questionnaire confirmed that, at the trial level as well,
we are not talking about a retained counsel system. People responding
said that retained counsel rarely, or never, handle capital cases. It is
either the public defender, a contract system or appointed private counsel
who handles these cases.
The questionnaires revealed that, from county to county, represen-
tation was described as "fair or worse" in an estimated zero to fifty per-
cent of the capital cases. From the questionnaires I saw, roughly fifteen
percent to twenty percent of the trial representation was considered sig-
nificantly substandard.
There was a division of opinion as to who provides the best repre-
sentation. Some counties stated that the public defenders clearly pro-
vided the best representation because the public defender office had the
expertise and the in-house training, which are very important. On the
7. See L.A. Daily J., Dec. 21, 1984, at 2, col. 3. The attorney, a former deputy state
public defender, had delayed filing appellant's opening brief for over fourteen months. Id.
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other hand, some counties said there was better representation from ap-
pointed counsel because the public defender's office was so overloaded
that they simply did not have the time and the staff to prepare those cases
adequately.
In the survey, I asked people to identify the most significant
problems at the trial level. I got three basic answers.
The first problem identified was money. We always come back to
money: the need for higher compensation for appointed counsel; the need
for greater budget allowances for second counsel in capital cases. More
than half of the counties that answered the survey said that they do, in
fact, provide second counsel in many capital cases.
It is important for members of county boards of supervisors to real-
ize how large these capital cases are and how important it is that there be
second auxiliary counsel available to help in their preparation. That be-
comes very important for public defender offices, which complain that
their budgets were set for normal caseloads. When one or two large capi-
tal cases came in unexpectedly, they were forced to squeeze their staff
beyond acceptable limits, and it affected both the capital and noncapital
cases. As a result, the capital cases did not really get the staff they
needed; public defender offices did not have second counsel to work on
the case. Also, as resources were diverted to the capital cases, the other
noncapital cases suffered.
There was a suggestion that if county supervisors would understand
this, they would be more willing to fund the enormous expenses that
unavoidably go into these cases. We are not talking about exaggerated
expenses; we are talking about necessary expenses.
The second major problem identified by those responding to the sur-
vey was the lack of screening of appointed counsel-the absence of some
peer review system to assure that qualified attorneys are appointed.
Some counties, such as Alameda County and Sacramento County, have
been very progressive, with a panel system to make sure that only attor-
neys in the top classification are appointed to take these capital cases.
Other counties have much less rigorous screening mechanisms, and the
results could be seen in the lower quality of representation provided by
appointed counsel who were not really up to taking these cases.
The third problem identified was the absence of adequate training.
Most counties indicated that, except for occasional statewide seminars,
they had no in-house or local training programs. Los Angeles County is
an exception in that regard. Any money that could come either from the
board of supervisors to public defenders, or from the Office of Criminal
Justice Planning in its training grants to the California Public Defenders
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Association, would make an enormous difference in raising the level of
competence in public defender attorneys.
If we do not do that, we see the results which everyone here has
indicated are undesirable: ineffective representation at the trial level, and
reversal on appeal because of that ineffective representation. 8 I want to
emphasize that when you see reversals on this ground, these are not mere
"technicalities" as they are described in the press. If we provide a capital
defendant with inadequate representation, we are really undermining the
legitimacy of the entire process and of the death judgment. We have to
deal with that problem.
I must say that California has been among the more progressive
states in addressing the adequacy of representation in capital cases. We
have done several things which are really quite commendable. The first,
as I indicated, was to increase the rate of compensation for appellate
attorneys to sixty dollars an hour, which has made an enormous differ-
ence. The second was that, since 1977, when the death penalty came
back into effect, California has had Penal Code section 987.9, 9 which
provides special moneys for preparation of capital cases at the trial level.
That appropriation was originally one million dollars per year. Last year
it was increased to four million dollars. It is probably the single most
important contributor to the quality of representation in capital cases in
California. I think most trial attorneys would agree with that.
On the appellate level, this year the California Appellate Project
(CAP) was formed. If the funding cutback in the State Public Defender
8. See, eg., People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d 835, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1983)
(first-degree murder conviction reversed due to attorney's failure to exploit facts favorable to
defendant as a result of attorney's joint representation of multiple defendants); People v. Moz-
ingo, 34 Cal. 3d 926, 671 P.2d 363, 196 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1983) (murder conviction reversed due
to attorney's failure to investigate potentially viable diminished capacity or insanity defenses,
to request appointment of a psychiatrist, and to introduce evidence of defendant's mental con-
dition as mitigating circumstance at penalty phase at trial); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142,
599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979) (murder conviction reversed due to attorney's failure
to properly investigate or present a diminished capacity defense), rev'd on other grounds, 39
Cal. 3d 803 (1985) (defense counsel cannot, for strategic reasons, refuse to present diminished
capacity defense at guilt phase of capital trial when defendant expressly requests that counsel
do so).
9. Section 987.9 of the California Penal Code, provides in pertinent part:
In the trial of a capital case the indigent defendant, through his counsel, may
request the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and
others for the preparation or presentation of the defense .... Upon receipt of an
application, a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the capital
case... shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an appro-
priate amount of money to defendant's attorney.... In making the ruling, the court
shall be guided by the need to provide a complete and full defense for the defendant.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (Deering Supp. 1985).
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Office was a step backwards, then the creation of CAP was a step for-
ward. Its creation would have been necessary even if funding of the State
Public Defender Office had not been cut back. Because the number of
death penalty cases being assigned to private counsel had been growing
so rapidly, we in the state office were really unable to provide the level of
assistance to the private bar that those cases required.
CAP is a nonprofit corporation established by the California State
Bar, partially in response to the cutback in the State Public Defender
Office. We are funded by contract with the Administrative Office of the
Courts.
One of the very encouraging aspects of CAP has been its nonparti-
san support. Supporting CAP is not a question of whether you are for or
against the death penalty, but whether you support the neutral principle
that capital defendants should receive adequate representation. I am
very gratified at the breadth of that support from the bar, from bar as-
sociations, from the courts and from the Attorney General.
What CAP does is recruit lawyers to take death penalty cases, as
well as other appeals and writs in the California Supreme Court. We are
trying to go not only to traditional sources, criminal appellate lawyers,
but also to the large civil firms. We are encouraging them to take one of
these cases as a quasi-pro bono effort-there is some compensation-with
the assurance that we in CAP will provide the technical expertise needed
in order to do these cases well.
The efforts so far have been very successful. In San Francisco, six
major firms have already indicated they will support the CAP project
and take a death penalty case. I encourage people from bar associations
who are here today to join the bar associations in San Francisco, Los
Angeles, Alameda and Kern Counties, which have been very helpful in
supporting the CAP program.
When people apply to the CAP program, we have to screen their
applications, not only for the amount of their experience, but also for the
demonstrated quality of their appellate work. That is an important les-
son we have to learn in terms of setting up a quality control system and
correlating lawyers with cases: numbers alone are not enough. The
number of cases the lawyer has handled may be a necessary condition,
but it is not a sufficient condition. There are many lawyers who have
done a lot of appeals who are not really qualified to do death penalty
appeals. We try to make sure that only those people who are qualified to
perform at the California Supreme Court level are appointed to capital
cases.
We have developed two lists of qualified attorneys for capital and
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noncapital cases in the state supreme court. Two years ago there was a
backlog of twenty-four cases without appointed counsel because the
court could not find qualified lawyers. That number is now down to
three, and will be zero shortly. My hope is that from now on appellate
counsel will be appointed shortly after the death judgment is filed.
The identification of qualified criminal appellate attorneys has been
gratifying, I think, to prosecutors as well as to defense people, because it
eliminates the delay in capital cases attributable to the inability to find
qualified counsel. It will also reduce the cost of appellate representation,
because I am convinced that doing a case right the first time with assist-
ance from people with expertise is, in the long run, the most effective and
economical way of providing these services. The CAP program is being
emulated by other states that are following California's model. We have
already won the American Bar Association's 1984 Harrison Tweed
Award for the best new criminal law program by a bar association to
improve the availability of legal services.
So to sum up, there are three basic things that are needed in order to
do capital cases well. The first is money. But money alone is not
enough. The second is a careful screening of lawyers, and a matching of
lawyers with cases. The third is a training and assistance program that
gives lawyers the expertise they need.
In the last two minutes, I would like to talk about what people here
can do to make the system work better, recognizing the progress that we
have already made.
One thing I might suggest, if there are any legislators here, is that
you think hard before you expand further the number of categories of
cases which make someone death-eligible. We already sentence forty
people to death each year in California. How many more people do we
need to sentence to death? There are almost 3000 homicides in Califor-
nia every year. The Briggs Initiative ostensibly tried to make every first-
degree murderer death-eligible.10 The system cannot possibly handle
that many people being sentenced to death.
More than that, if you look at the history of executions in California
in the twentieth century, the highest number of people ever executed here
in one year was seventeen-in 1933. The average for this century is less
than six per year.
Do we really need to increase the number of death-eligible catego-
ries? Even if you are in favor of capital punishment, do we need to in-
10. See CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, PROPOSITION 7 MURDER PENALTY-INITI-
ATIVE STATUTE (Argument in Favor of Proposition 7, distributed for Nov. 1978 election).
Dec. 1985]
390 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:383
crease the categories so that more than forty people will be sentenced to
death each year? Because if we do that, we will only overload the system
even further.
Prosecutors are beginning to use increased discretion as to the cases
in which they seek the death penalty. I think that is part of the reason
we see the number of capital filings and the number of death judgments
declining; and that is as it should be.
I hope you will continue to support the efforts to restore the State
Public Defender Office to its previous funding level. I hope you will
continue to support the CAP program. I hope county boards of supervi-
sors will not only provide more support for their public defender offices'
capital training programs, but will also try to set up an appointment sys-
tem that does not look only to cost. Cost is a legitimate concern. I un-
derstand that. But cost alone, without a concern for quality, will not
provide the representation which these cases require. Representation in
capital cases must be high quality, not only because it is constitutionally
required, but because it is, fundamentally, only right that capital defend-
ants receive quality representation.
We have come a very long way in California. We also still have a
considerable way to go. We at CAP will be happy to work with you to
get there.
Thank you very much.
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FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Norman Lefstein*
Ladies and gentlemen, my assignment this morning, as the program
indicates, is to provide a national perspective on financing the right to
counsel.
As I contemplated last week what to tell this audience, I thought
about an event that occurred to a friend of mine last summer. My friend,
an attorney, purchased a power lawnmower. The lawnmower came with
many parts and detailed instructions. My friend worked on assembling it
for a long period of time. Finally, frustrated by his inability to put it
together, he left it for another day and went out to play golf. He came
back several hours later to discover, to his absolute amazement, that his
lawnmower had been assembled by his uneducated and illiterate handy-
man. Since the instructions for assembling the lawnmower had been of
no use to the handyman, my friend turned to him and said, "How is it
that you were able to assemble this lawnmower?" The handyman re-
plied, "Those of us who are unable to read have got to think."
What does this story have to do with financing the right to counsel?
Well, in one sense, there is a relationship between the problem that con-
fronted the handyman and the problem that faces the fifty states in pro-
viding attorneys to the poor in criminal cases. The handyman had
detailed instructions on how to assemble the lawnmower; similarly the
legal profession over the last decade has developed detailed written
guidelines or standards, "instructions" if you will, on how to provide the
right to counsel.
For example, there are the standards for defense representation to
which Jerry Uelmen referred, which were developed by the American
Bar Association.1
However, in one major respect, the situation that confronts the de-
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina and Reporter, ABA Standards on
Providing Defense Services. Professor Lefstein served as an Assistant United States Attorney
in Washington, D.C. and as Director of the District of Columbia Public Defender Office. He
was a member of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants and
the Board of Directors of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Professor Lef-
stein is currently Vice-chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Section. His publications include
Criminal Defense Services for the Poor (1982) which addresses methods and programs for pro-
viding legal representation and the need for adequate financing.
1. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
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livery of defense services in this country is very different from that of the
handyman. The handyman could not have assembled the power lawn-
mower unless he had all of the necessary parts. And while he had all of
the necessary parts, the "necessary parts" for defense services are contin-
gent upon adequate financing.
Undoubtedly, some social problems in this country cannot be signifi-
cantly ameliorated even if additional funding is provided. Perhaps some
problems can be resolved without additional revenues. But the delivery
of defense services requires sufficient funding if the representation is to be
effective. You can have the finest instructions; they can be cogent and
detailed; but instructions alone are not enough. Lawnmowers, to be as-
sembled, must have the necessary parts; defense services, to be effective,
must be financed at a high level.
In 1982, I prepared a report on behalf of the American Bar Associa-
tion dealing with criminal defense services for the poor. I wrote in the
report that "[tihe financing of defense services in the United States today
is grossly inadequate."2 This statement continues to be true in 1985.
Based on data that were compiled in approximately 1980, I estimated
that approximately $435 million was being spent on criminal defense
services nationwide.3 Subsequent to my report, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics of the United States Department of Justice did another study of
the defense services in which it was estimated that as of 1982, the amount
of money spent for defense services in the United States was more than
$600 million.4 This points up the undeniable fact that during the past
few years the amount of money spent on criminal defense services nation-
wide has increased, just as I know it has increased here in the State of
California.5
Yet, there is today abundant evidence of enormous financial
problems in the delivery of criminal defense services in this state and
elsewhere. Accordingly, in the area of criminal defense services-an area
in which a constitutional right is at stake-defense counsel are routinely
asked to work for what is oftentimes patently inadequate compensation.
In contrast, neither judges nor prosecutors are asked to donate their time
in the way that defense lawyers are required to do.
What are the trends in the delivery of defense services in the United
2. N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 14 (1982).
3. Id. at 10.
4. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS 7 (August 1984) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU REPORT].
5. The 1982 California expenditure for indigent defense services was $166,761,094. BU-
REAU REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. The expenditure for those services in 1980 was $93,290,267.
N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 2, at A-10.
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States today? I have already indicated that, generally, there has been
some overall increase in the level of financing. What I would like to do
now is sketch for you four other major trends in the area of criminal
defense representation. All of these trends, moreover, are relevant to the
situation here in California.
The first of these trends is the increased use of contract defense pro-
grams in providing criminal defense services. What do I mean by a "con-
tract"? I refer to the practice of governmental units contracting with one
or more attorneys, private law firms, or bar associations to provide de-
fense services to a number of defendants for a fixed sum of money. This,
of course, is quite different from using an institutional public defender, or
from having an individual attorney assigned to a case who, upon comple-
tion of the representation, submits a voucher for compensation.
About ten years ago there were virtually no contract defenders in
the United States. Five years ago they were relatively uncommon. To-
day it is estimated that perhaps as many as six percent of the counties in 4 '%,
the United States provide defense representation pursuant to contracts
with private attorneys.' Unfortunately, this growth in contract defense
has been accompanied by a trend toward awarding contracts based solely
upon the cost to be borne by the county or other unit of government. All
too often government officials have been insufficiently concerned about
the defendant's constitutional right to adequate counsel. It is obviously
critical that contracts for defense representation take into account the
quality of representation as well as its cost. I know that this subject is a
matter of deep concern here in California, just as it is in many other parts
of the country.7
In Arizona, concern about a contract for defense representation was
made a subject of constitutional challenge. In April, 1984, the Arizona
Supreme Court held in the case of State v. Smith' that the contract de-
fense system in use in Mojave County, Arizona violated the rights of
defendants to due process and effective assistance of counsel under the
Arizona and United States Constitutions.9 With only one exception,
every award of a contract for defense representation during the four
years preceding the case had gone to the lowest bidder. That one excep-
6. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
7. Guidelines concerning the award of contracts for criminal defense were approved by
the California State Bar several years ago. See Ranii, Contract Defense Guidelines, 4 NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 14, 1981, at 28. See also NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING INDIGENT LEGAL DEFENSE CONTRACTS
(Tent. Draft Sept. 19, 1983).
8. 140 Ariz. 355, 681 P.2d 1374 (1984).
9. Id. at 362, 681 P.2d at 1381.
Dec. 1985]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:391
tion was an instance where the lowest bid was by an attorney who had
been held in contempt for failing to file a brief in a criminal case and who
had been the subject of repeated complaints.'1
Because of the growth of contract defense services and the concerns
that that growth has generated, a resolution on the subject will be
presented to the American Bar Association House of Delegates at its
1985 midwinter meeting. The resolution is sponsored by the Criminal
Justice Section of the ABA and other interested association groups. It
reads, in part, as follows:
The American Bar Association opposes the awarding of
governmental contracts for criminal defense services on the ba-
sis of cost alone or through competitive bidding without refer-
ence to quality representation.
In order to achieve constitutionally effective representa-
tion, the awarding of governmental contracts for criminal de-
fense should additionally be based on qualitative criteria such
as experience, workload maximums, staffing ratios, criminal
law practice expertise and training, supervision and compensa-
tion guidelines.1
It is sometimes difficult to predict what the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association will do, but in this instance I think it is
clear that the resolution will be unanimously approved. This issue is of
considerable concern to the organized bar and the resolution cannot rea-
sonably be opposed.2
A second major national trend relates to the increased use of sepa-
rate attorneys for each defendant in multiple defendant cases. The trend
can be traced to the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Holloway v. Arkan-
sas,13 which has led to a more stringent definition of what constitutes a
conflict of interest. The trend, of course, is evident here in California.
As Attorney General Van de Kamp noted this morning, the California
Supreme Court has held that normally each defendant in a multiple de-
10. Id. at 360, 681 P.2d at 1379.
11. House of Delegates Res. Ila (passed Feb., 1985).
12. The resolution was unanimously approved by the ABA House of Delegates at its mid-
winter meeting in Detroit, Michigan in February, 1985. See ABA Approves Resolutions on
Indigent Criminal Defendants, 7 NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDER Assoc. CORNERSTONE,
March-April 1985, at 1.
13. 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978) (failure of the trial court to either appoint separate counsel
for codefendants or to be certain that a conflict warranting separate counsel does not exist
deprives defendants of sixth amendment guarantee of "assistance of counsel").
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fendant criminal case must receive separate counsel.14 Because this trend
requires that additional attorneys be appointed, it necessarily increases
the overall cost of defense representation in California and elsewhere.
A third major trend is the upward movement of the amount of fees
paid to attorneys who accept assignments to cases on an individual basis.
Last October, for the first time in fourteen years, Congress and the Presi-
dent agreed on amendments to the Federal Criminal Justice Act to in-
crease the compensation paid to private attorneys who take
appointments in the federal courts. 5 The rate of compensation thus
jumped from thirty dollars to sixty dollars an hour for out-of-court time
and twenty dollars to forty dollars for in-court time, and the maximum
level of compensation rose to $800 for misdemeanors and $2000 for
felonies.
16
During the past two years a number of states also have increased
their rates of compensation to attorneys, among them Alabama, 7 Kan-
18 and ~~~~20 Mroeee n ttsas,11 Illinois 9 and Tennessee. Moreover, there is even one state
supreme court-the Supreme Court of Iowa-which said in 1981 that
attorneys should receive full compensation, ruling that no discounts
should be required when an attorney represents the poor. a' In examining
more recent decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court, however, it appears
that this 1981 opinion is being given a narrow interpretation.22
It is also important to keep this trend in proper perspective. Often,
increases in the compensation paid to attorneys have come about as a
result of a crisis in the jurisdiction. Several years ago, for example, the
attorneys in the District of Columbia who normally took a majority of
the assigned cases refused to accept additional appointments unless
something was done about the fee structure; they simply walked out.
The City Council and the Congress got the message and reformed the
legislation for the payment of assigned counsel in the nation's capital.23
14. People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 115, 672 P.2d 835, 853, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 70-71
(1983).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1969 & Supp. 1985).
16. Id.
17. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
18. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4507 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
21. Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 1981).
22. Walters v. Herrick, 351 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 1984) (burden of proof is on attorney
to show that the reasonable compensation standard was not applied; "full compensation" is
only the actual value of necessary services and does not guarantee a fixed hourly rate for all
time spent by the attorney).
23. D.C. CODE § 11-2604 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (maximum amounts increased to $900 for
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In addition, in states where fees have been increased (as well as in states
where they have not), judicial approval of vouchers continues to be re-
quired.24 This means, regrettably, that compensation awards often are
arbitrarily decreased. 25 As a result, attorneys do not receive even the full
level of compensation that the legislature has authorized. I should add
parenthetically that the American Bar Association Standards reject the
idea of judicial approval of vouchers, stating that "compensation for as-
signed counsel should be approved by administrators of assigned counsel
programs. ' 26 As the commentary explains, this procedure is essential to
secure the independence of assigned counsel and to assure that the pay-
ments to private attorneys will be equitable.27
Further, to keep this upward trend in fees in perspective, one also
needs to understand that nationwide compensation levels are still exceed-
ingly low. Oftentimes, the fees are in the range of twenty or thirty dol-
lars an hour,2" which is not even enough to cover the attorney's
overhead.29 And in some areas of the country, regardless of whether the
fees are adequate, the budgetary appropriation is not. In New Hamp-
shire, for example, it was recently reported that $500,000 in approved
vouchers cannot be paid because there is no appropriation to cover the
cost.
30
A fourth trend in the area of defense services is toward the funding
of criminal defense services by state governments. This trend recognizes
that uniformity of defense services can best be assured if the state pro-
vides the payments. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics report
to which I referred earlier, as of 1982, in eighteen states the state govern-
ments provided all funds for criminal defense.31  Additionally, eight
other state governments provided a majority of the defense funds.32
Since 1982, two additional states-Iowa and Oregon-have approved
misdemeanors and $1700 for felonies). In response to the boycott by attorneys, the Federal
Trade Commission filed an action alleging conduct in restraint of trade. The position of the
Federal Trade Commission has been rejected by an administrative law judge. In re Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 104 F.T.C. No. 9171, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 122,204 (1984).
See also Middleton, The Indigent Fee Strike: Antitrust Law v. Lawyers, 7 NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25,
1985, at 13.
24. See supra notes 17-20.
25. See, eg., N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47.
26. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard 5.24.
27. IM at 5.32-5.33.
28. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
29. N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 2, at 22.
30. Silas, Lag in Pay for Indigent Defense Riles N.H. Bar, BAR LEADER, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at
25.
31. See BUREAU REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
32. Id.
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state funding for defense services. 3
The trends to which I refer-contract defense services, use of sepa-
rate attorneys in conflict cases, increased fees for assigned counsel and
the movement toward state funding of criminal defense services-all bear
some relevance to the situation in California. On the other hand, there is
one subject which has attracted great interest in California, but which
has not received quite the same attention in the other forty-nine states. I
refer to Yarbrough v. Superior Court,34 in which a California appellate
court has held that counsel can be appointed in a civil case, as a constitu-
tional necessity, and can be required to serve without compensation. The
California courts may well be on the cutting edge of legal history in this
area. In other state courts in this country, the right to appointed counsel
in civil cases has not been generally recognized.35 It should be noted,
however, that some federal court decisions have required counsel to serve
in civil cases even when no compensation was available. These decisions
have sometimes been based upon constitutional principles 36 and some-
times upon federal in forma pauperis statutes.37 Consider, for example,
the decision in Bradshaw v. United States District Court,38 which held
that counsel had to be appointed in a sex discrimination case pursuant to
federal law. On September 7, 1984, after the case had been before the
court on several occasions, the Ninth Circuit reversed itself.39 In light of
opposition from the bar, the court recognized, in effect, that a coercive
appointment of counsel to provide representation simply did not make
sense.4 Counsel's unwillingness to provide representation in Bradshaw
stemmed apparently from the plaintiff's litigiousness and from the sub-
stantial costs that would have been incurred by the attorney, without any
assurance that the costs would ever be recovered.41 Although the court
33. OR. REv. STAT. § 135.055 (1983 & Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.7 (1979 &
Supp. 1984).
34. 150 Cal. App. 3d 388, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1983), remanded, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d
583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
35. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 645 P.2d 851 (Colo. App. 1982); Jolly v. Wright, 300
N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87
(1975).
36. See, e.g., Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. McQuade,
647 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 958 (1982).
37. See, e.g., Childs v. Ducksworth, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming denial of coun-
sel but recognizing that due process and fundamental fairness would require appointment of
counsel in some cases).
38. 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (Bradshaw II).
39. Bradshaw v. United States District Court, 742 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1984) (Bradshaw
III).
40. Id. at 517-18.
41. Id.
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in Bradshaw acknowledged that in extreme cases coercive appointments
of counsel might sometimes be necessary,42 the lesson of the case is clear.
It is the same lesson that has been learned in the criminal context: in
order for a constitutional right to counsel to be meaningfully imple-
mented, the attorneys appointed must be compensated.
The vast majority of courts have concluded that some compensation
must be paid to counsel in criminal cases.43 Usually, however, the courts
have ruled that the amount need not equal what an attorney can earn in a
retained case.' But occasionally even the requirement of minimal com-
pensation has been declared unnecessary. For example, a few years ago
in Missouri there was no appropriation from which to pay assigned coun-
sel. The Missouri Supreme Court held that, at least for a short period,
appointed attorneys in criminal cases could be required to serve without
compensation.4 5 Eventually, the court recognized, compensation would
have to be provided.46 In response to this decision, the Missouri Legisla-
ture established a statewide system for the appointment and payment of
attorneys in criminal cases.47
It has been twenty-two years since the Supreme Court guaranteed,
in Gideon v. Wainwright,48 the right to an attorney in state felony prose-
cutions. Twenty-two years is a relatively short period in this nation's
history; yet during this time we have made great strides in delivering
criminal defense services. But to say that we have progressed far is not to
suggest that we have gone as far as we need to go or that all of the
problems in providing counsel have been addressed in a satisfactory way.
It is important, moreover, to remain mindful that without the necessary
financing, without the requisite "parts," there can be no meaningful, ade-
quate and effective defense services for the poor.
42. "[W]e do not mean to suggest that coercive appointments are never proper. In some
situations they will be." Id. at 518.
43. N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20.
44. Id. at 21-22.
45. State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142
(1982).
46. Id. at 67.
47. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.019 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: THE
OREGON EXPERIENCE
R. William Linden, Jr.*
I am pleased to be with you today to share, for what it is worth, the
recent experience of the State of Oregon in financing and providing de-
fense services for indigents.
This is an issue which I think all of you will agree is one of the most
critical facing the justice system today. My remarks are going to be lim-
ited to our role in providing criminal indigent defense.
As I outline the Oregon experience, please keep in mind that our
two states are very different. We have a statewide population of roughly
2.6 million. Our urban centers are few in number and very modest in
size compared with yours. Statewide, we have just less than 8000 law-
yers and we have only 159 trial court judges in Oregon. The practical
solutions that we have found in this area may or may not be transferable
or realistic in the State of California.
Until January 1, 1983, our trial courts and criminal indigent defense
services were funded by the counties. In 1983, the trial and appellate
court systems were administratively unified and state funds were pro-
vided for court operations and services.
Under this new system, the Office of the State Court Administrator
is responsible by statute for administering the criminal defense system.
In 1983, we expect to spend approximately $34 million on indigent de-
fense. This represents twenty-eight percent of the total amount for our
budget, so it was a very significant part of our funding package. On a per
capita basis, we spend $4.80 on indigent defense. This is the fourth high-
est per capita expenditure figure in the United States.
In the upcoming biennium, which starts July 1, 1985, we expect to
spend closer to $40 million on indigent defense. Much of the increase
will be attributable to the fact that in November of 1984 the voters of
* State Court Administrator for the Oregon Judicial Department. Mr. Linden has been
involved in court administration for the last eleven years. He began his career as Research
Assistant for the Colorado Judicial Department and has held the positions of Court Manage-
ment Intern, Analyst, Assistant Project Director for the Courts' Technical Assistance Project
and Trial Court Administrator. Mr. Linden is a member of the Institute for Judicial Adminis-
tration and has served on the Board of Directors of the Oregon Association for Court Admin-
istration and on the Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee, Lane County Council of
Governments.
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Oregon instituted the death penalty. My office will also be responsible
for coordinating the provision of defense services in these capital cases.
Transfer of responsibility for funding criminal indigent defense serv-
ices was a direct result of local funding problems. The constant variable
in the process was the counties' desire to rid themselves of an unpopular
and largely uncontrollable expense at a time when their financial re-
sources were diminishing.
Since the late 1970's, Oregon has experienced some very severe eco-
nomic difficulties. High interest rates, and recession in response to those
rates, have really weakened the state. The wood products industry has
long been the linchpin of Oregon's economy. With housing starts down,
the demand for wood products decreasing and foreign competition rising,
the economic house of cards which the State of Oregon had in place be-
gan to crumble. The resulting negative impact on government revenues
was predictable.
This was all exacerbated by the state's two-tier system of taxation.
We have very high property taxes and very high income taxes, but no
sales tax. Most of the property tax revenue goes to education. Most of
the income tax revenue goes for state agency operations. The counties
receive little from these two sources. The system stayed on its feet when
times were flush. But as economic problems worsened, we reached a cri-
sis point. The whole situation was worsened by the fact that federal reve-
nues dropped significantly in this time period as well.
Many of the counties, because they received so little from the prop-
erty tax and income tax revenues, had grown very dependent on federal
timber receipts. These were moneys that the counties were paid when
timber was cut on federal land in the various counties.
I will use my home county, Lane County, as an example. These
federal revenues made up fifty percent of the county-generated budget.
When all of these facts came together, Lane County in two fiscal years
went from a general fund budget of $50 million to a general fund budget
of $28 million. As this crisis hit us, popular programs such as services
for veterans and seniors suffered. In five counties every single deputy in
the sheriff's department was pulled off the road because we had no
money to pay salaries and no money to pay for equipment. So, in this
environment, it is probably not too hard to understand that the county
commissioners were not the least bit pleased about having to allocate
significant amounts of funds for indigent defense services.
All of these factors came together in the 1981 legislative session.
The counties made a very concerted and well-organized effort to transfer
funding responsibility to the state. Eventually, the legislature agreed to
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this transfer. Many of us involved in the system thought that state fund-
ing was a necessary change and not simply because of the funding diffi-
culty at the county level. State courts ought to be funded by the state.
This was an expensive proposition for the state. On a biennial basis,
the courts cost about $125 million, and the revenues that come in as a
result of our operation run approximately at $70 million. We had, and
have, some grumbling from legislators about that additional cost, partic-
ularly since some of the county proponents painted a much rosier picture
about revenues and represented that the new system would not cost the
state much. For example, these proponents estimated that the state
would recoup for indigent defendants close to seventy-five percent of the
cost of providing court-appointed counsel. This would be recouped after
the case was adjudicated and the indigent defendants had finished proba-
tion or served their sentence. We have found that ten percent recoup-
ment is a lot closer to the norm.
You should keep in mind, in looking at the cost of the statewide
system, that projections need to be realistic. The Chief Justice and I have
encountered considerable problems with the legislature in trying to ex-
plain, three years after the fact, why the original estimates made by other
interested parties were not quite on target. During the last year of
county funding for criminal defense services we started to see some
alarming trends, among them a tendency to go for low-bid contracts.
There was also quite a bit of pressure put on the trial court judges to be
very conservative in approving fee requests for appointed counsel.
A number of counties made it very clear that if the indigent defense
pot in the county ran short, the balance would be made up out of general
court operating budgets. For example, we actually had a county where
the indigent defense funds ran out, and the court there was forced to
suspend civil jury trials for six months in order to keep the criminal side
of the court going. As a result of this, a significant number of lawyers
asked to be taken off the court appointment list because they were not
willing to work for fees which did not come close to compensating them
at the level they thought was appropriate.
The system we now have in place uses a variety of types of indigent
service. We have contracts and we make individual appointments. Our
contractors include private, nonprofit public defender organizations, law
firms, sole practitioners and consortiums of attorneys who have banded
together to provide defense services. Roughly fifty-five percent of our
cases are handled by contract. The balance are private appointments.
We have made a conscious effort in Oregon to keep the private bar
involved in providing services. We have done this for one basic reason:
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to make sure that we keep a number of lawyers in private practice profi-
cient in defense work. We do not want this existing resource to dry up.
The private bar has been very responsive in cooperating with us since the
new system went into effect. We have been able to pay them a more
reasonable fee, and they have been willing, in virtually all of our counties,
to take whatever cases we ask them to handle.
In our contracting process, we have avoided and will continue to
avoid overemphasizing cost. We stress attorney qualification and experi-
ence as well as the ability of the contractor to manage the indigent de-
fense contract. We have to be satisfied in those two areas before we even
start looking at the cost.
We require contract attorneys, for example, to maintain caseloads
that are consistent with national guidelines. We require contractors to
keep adequate staff, such as investigators and paralegals. We require
contractors to meet regularly with our trial court judges and administra-
tors to talk about any contract problems that may occur. We make them
tell us how we can best supervise the inexperienced attorney staff. We
make them give us a plan for continuing legal education and training for
their staff. We do everything we can to build quality control factors in
our contract system. Many of these quality-oriented requirements are
included in our written contracts so that there is no question that the
contractors remain aware of these concerns during their contract period.
Our indigent defense contracts are not the least expensive you will
find in the United States. On the average, we pay approximately $300
per contract case. I do think that our system works relatively well be-
cause of the built-in quality control features that I mentioned. We hope
we will never be in a position where cost becomes the overriding factor. I
think that if you can avoid this, you can have contract systems that work
quite well. We found that the legislature is only slightly more excited
about indigent defense expenditures than were the counties. We have
had a very difficult time justifying these expenditures to them. I think
this will always be the case.
If all government services were as closely scrutinized as our indigent
defense budget, I am sure that the Oregon Legislature could find savings
in all state agency programs. We have made a conscious effort to educate
as many members of the legislature as we can on both the constitutional
issues involved here and the practical aspects of providing defense serv-
ices: what it costs, what is involved, who is to do the work. These efforts
have helped us to reach what I think is a reasonable level of funding, and
hopefully we will be able to maintain this in the future. Our legislators
have jumped over the first big hurdle. They know about the responsibil-
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ity to provide these service in an adequate manner. They are sensitive to
the problems. It is just that when it comes down to putting the pencil to
the paper and writing in the appropriate number, they balk a bit because
it remains an unpopular way to spend public funds.
During the interim period after our 1983 legislative session, the
court system worked very closely with the Legislative Interim Judiciary's
Task Force on Defense. We worked quite closely with this group. The
number one item on our agenda was the question whether the judicial
branch ought to remain in its present role in the indigent delivery system.
Frankly, the Chief Justice and I have always been uncomfortable with
the present structure, which requires the judiciary to play an intimate
role in the funding and administration of one side of the adversary pro-
cess in the criminal justice system.
The result of our work with the committee is a bill that has been
introduced by the Oregon Commission on the Judicial Branch, a statu-
tory body designed for court operation, which would create an independ-
ent policy commission on the indigent defense area. The members of this
commission would be appointed by the Chief Justice, but the bill pro-
vides that they would maintain virtual operational independence. We
think this bill is going to pass. We really are convinced that, in the long
run, this area is best administered by an independent board, not by the
judicial branch of government. This is not to say that we will not remain
supportive of funding adequacy and things of this nature.
To summarize, I think we have learned a few things in the past
couple of years. First, the shift from county to state funding was needed
and was desirable. State revenues are more stable than are local reve-
nues, and we have a better level of funding today than we would have if
we stayed under the county system.
As a matter of fact, if we had stayed with that system only another
year or two more, we would have been in a real crisis, because the eco-
nomic picture did not get better. We saw the trends of low-bid con-
tracting and attorneys leaving the court appointed list because we could
not pay them fairly. We are fortunate that Oregon made this change at
the time that it did.
I am not thoroughly familiar with the situation here in California. I
understand the effects of Proposition 13 are beginning to be felt at the
local level. It may well be that looking at the issue of state funding for
defense services now may be a better time than later.
We feel that our mixed system of contracts and court appointments
is working. The key to the contract system is to make sure that contracts
are quality-oriented and not simply cost-oriented.
Dec. 1985]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:399
We have also found that we are able to provide more consistent
services statewide. Under the county system we had a sort of feast or
famine arrangement: in some counties the defense system worked, in
other counties it did not. I think one of the major advantages of state
funding is that you can provide quality service in all jurisdictions, and
you can also impose statewide standards on performance and quality.
One thing needs to be kept in mind: just as you have to have stan-
dards, you also have to leave contractors the independence to do the job
right. Striking this balance is not the easiest thing in the world to do. To
reemphasize, we do feel, on a statewide basis, that an independent policy
board to govern defense services is the way to go. Neither the judicial
nor the executive branches of government ought to be directly in charge
of policy issues, funding or administering defense services.
Lastly, this will never be a popular expenditure. Those groups in-
volved must continue to educate the public and themselves about the
issues involved. I think that is the only way we are going to assure that
we maintain a reasonable level of funding for a government service which
must always be with us.
Thank you for your attention.
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FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
REPORTS FROM DISCUSSION GROUPS
As the Conference broke for lunch, Conference Director
Gerald F. Uelmen divided the attendees into six groups to discuss
the issues and concerns raised that morning. What follows are
the reports from each of the discussion groups, led by discussion
leaders Ephraim Margolin, Clyde M. Blackmon, Gerald Blank,
Alex Landon, David Heilbron and Wilbur Littlefield.
REPORT FROM DISCUSSION GROUP NUMBER ONE
Ephraim Margolin*
It will be impossible to do justice to everything we discussed, but I
will mention a couple of things that stimulated my own thinking and
perhaps will be helpful to everyone.
The first issue we discussed was: What is the best system? It was
our consensus that public defenders, with a mixture of the retained bar, is
the preferable system. Any defense delivery system which excludes sig-
nificant contributions from the private bar is unacceptable.
Then there was a question: Why not have two public defenders spell
each other? And we had some discussion on that. Again, it was our
consensus that cross-fertilization between the two branches of the defense
bar is needed; you need noninstitutional input to spark innovation and
experimentation, and to provide an "inter-tutorial function." We dis-
cussed the notion that we work in bureaucracies and that it is imperative,
on occasion, to get out of the bureaucracy and get a breath of fresh air
for good or for bad. So, the answer to the first question discussed in our
group, with more consensus on that than on anything else, is to favor a
system of public defenders with a strong mixture of private bar.
There were several who felt that it would be good if the private law-
yers assigned had some supervision, and the Santa Clara experience was
suggested. However, we did not really explore this enough to make a
recommendation.
The next area of concern discussed was cost effectiveness. There
was a fear that as soon as you start talking budgets, people become statis-
tics and you go into assembly line justice, and you have four dollars per
* Attorney, Law Offices of Ephraim Margolin, San Francisco, California. Mr. Margolin
was the founding President of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and is currently
Vice President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
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person or you have five dollars per person; whatever it is, you lose sight
of where you are going with individual cases. We must beware of any
system in which the only really important thing is to dispose of the
caseload so as to justify the budget. Here again, we feel that any system
which will not permit some creativity, some experimentation, some unu-
sual approaches in the unusual case, is not constitutionally acceptable.
There was a response to this from a former legislator in our group who
felt that, if you permit this spigot to be turned on without any controls,
you may reach another unacceptable position.
In the end, we were unanimous that our concern with bureaucratic
stultification is a close second to our concern with funding. You need
money, but you also need to be damned sure that with that money you
do not buy complacency.
The third issue we addressed was flexibility. What happens with the
large cases? Not everybody has a De Lorean or a Corona 2 or a Corenev-
sky3 in their midst. But some special arrangement is necessary, not only
for capital cases and those cases identified here today as special areas
requiring funding and supervision resources, but also in anticipation of
the possibility that we will continue federalizing our criminal system and
that tomorrow we may have local versions of RICO4 or CFA5 cases,
which almost inevitably mean four, five or six month trials. This is an
entirely different financial ballgame; it is entirely different from street
crime cases. The extent to which we may have to face such problems is
simply beyond our discussion today.
And now I turn to the discussion of the issue of county funding,
which perhaps occupied half of our time, and in which I must say, I
learned things and got quite a number of surprises.
Our discussion started with several people predicting that state
funding is inevitable. Therefore, what more is there to talk about? State
funding is coming. Very rapidly, a counter-argument developed that if
"the state is coming," what then is there to protect state funding from a
governor who did to the California appellate system what Governor
George Deukmejian did last year?
If you go to the state for funding, you may face a governor who, for
1. United States v. United States District Court, 717 F.2d 478 (1983).
2. People v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 193, 636 P.2d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1981).
3. Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr. 165
(1984).
4. Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
5. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984) (codi-
fied throughout Titles 18, 19, 21, 26 & 28).
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political reasons, will cut the whole system to the bone. But even before
you get to the governor and to the "iffy" situation of budgeting by polit-
ical whim, you have to sell the program to legislators.
And there was real concern in our group that the local public de-
fender can establish a more personal relationship by going to the county
supervisors. The moment you become statewide, this personal relation-
ship will not exist; you will be left with the rule that quality, like water,
always descends to the lowest point of the common denominator. It
would be difficult to convince state legislators that defense efforts need to
be adequately funded. It will be difficult to explain in politically palat-
able terms why more funding is needed, especially when a case is highly
publicized.
Toward the end of our discussion we felt that the specter of deliber-
ate gutting of the State Public Defenders Office requires reassessment of
statewide financing. I think we all became troubled by this issue, even
those of us who had not thought of it before.
And without saying that there was a consensus, because there can-
not be after forty-five minutes of discussion, I think that all of us stood
back in thoughtful consideration that there may be some mixture possi-
ble; that perhaps there ought to be some local option left; that perhaps
we do need certain select items, such as the cost of jurors, the cost of the
overhead, whatever, under state aegis to help the counties. Perhaps we
can approach this in a political way so that what is allocated to the
county by the state will keep the system going, without abolishing local
option.
I was surprised to hear-and I do not lay a claim that we have a
representative panel-but I was surprised to hear that at least three dif-
ferent counties are happy with what they had. Their representatives
seem to think that, in an imperfect world, the solutions which they have
developed are reasonable. The question was: Should it reasonably be
expected that state funding will be any better than what presently is
available?
I walk away from all of this feeling more disturbed by, and more
thoughtful about, state financing than I was when I came in. When I
came in here, I did see state funding as a likely alternative, responsive to
our concern for quality representation. I was much clearer in my convic-
tions, without realizing either their towering ignorance or the prejudices
on which they were based. After listening for a short period of time to
my colleagues in the group, I am no longer as positive that I could make
any strong recommendations without further thought.
Finally, a question to the Chair: We would like to know where you
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will go from here? Is the State Bar going to get into the business of
developing standards? Are we going to start looking at the option of
state versus county funding? Who will do it? How will they do it?
I, for one, feel that with this report I contributed to the possibility
that there will be a next stage. Should there be such a next stage, we
strongly recommend that, regardless of the outcome, that is, regardless of
who funds the defense and how it is funded, there has to be careful pro-
tection for excellence, and an effort at integrating the retained and the
appointed mixture of sections of the defense bar.
REPORT FROM DIsCUSSION GROUP NUMBER Two
Clyde M. Blackmon**
The consensus of our group is that defense should best be provided
primarily by the public defender, augmented by a panel of private attor-
neys who would handle those cases which could not be taken, for one
reason or another, by the public defender. An example of that is the
system already in effect in Santa Clara County. Sacramento County also
has a system which utilizes panel attorneys to represent defendants
whose cases cannot be handled by the public defender's office.
We feel that it is important to keep the private bar involved in the
representation of indigent criminal defendants. The system which
utilizes a panel of lawyers can accomplish that purpose. Of course, the
competency of private lawyers who serve on the panel must be main-
tained at a level equal to that to be found in most of the public defenders'
offices in this state. That can be done by assigning the panel attorneys to
various categories based upon their length of practice and by conducting
evaluations of their experience and performance in court. Only those
lawyers in the highest categories of experience and performance should
be permitted to handle the more serious cases.
The continued competency of the panel lawyers can be maintained
by mandatory attendance at training sessions or seminars. Periodic peer
review of the work done by the panel attorneys would also help to insure
that the lawyers are competent to handle the cases assigned to them.
Finally, we felt that the courts should not be involved in the process
by which the panel attorneys are paid for their services. The concern
there is for the maintenance of the independence of the lawyers who rep-
resent the indigent defendant.
** Attorney, Blackmon & Corn, Sacramento, California. Mr. Blackmon is a member of
the Board of Governors of California Attorneys for Criminal Justice.
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On the question of whether the state or the counties should pay for
indigent representation, it was the consensus of our group that the state
must pick up the tab. It is the case that since the passage of Proposition
13 the counties are finding it increasingly more difficult to pay the costs
of indigent representation. Thus, sooner or later, the state will have to
provide the money. In this regard, we have concerns similar to those just
expressed by Ephraim Margolin. The funding apparatus at the state
level must be insulated in some degree from the political process. Unfor-
tunately, we did not come up with many ideas on how that might be
done.
On the question of how much money we need, our answer is: more,
much more.
The final question that concerned us was: Is anyone in this building
listening to what is going on here today? I just see the same people here
talking about the same old things that many of us have talked about at
various meetings around the state for a long time. How do we make the
political process work in terms of dealing with the questions that brought
us here today?
REPORT FROM DISCUSSION GROUP NUMBER THREE
Gerald Blank***
Well, as I understood the assignment that Gerald Uelmen gave us
when we broke for lunch, it was to find the ideal system for the delivery
of quality legal services to indigents. Our discussion group quickly
agreed that the ideal system is one with unlimited funding (which comes
from wherever it comes from) to well-qualified and well-trained criminal
defense lawyers (who will do an excellent job in defending their clients),
so the system works. Only those actually guilty are sentenced and those
who are innocent are acquitted. Consequently, our discussion group
quickly turned away from the ideal system. We frankly did not go down
the list because several ideas quickly came out. Some of them in particu-
lar may be very helpful.
We were fortunate in our group to have a diverse cross-section of
county representation. We had people from Imperial, San Joaquin, San
Bernardino and Kern Counties.
The main feeling, I think, was that the biggest problem in the system
now that has to be dealt with is the large case; death penalty cases and
*** Attorney, San Diego, California. Mr. Blank is the Chair of the California State Bar
Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services to Criminal Defendants.
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major trials. You see problems, for example, in Los Angeles County, in
cases like the McMartin case6 which will take months just to do the pre-
liminary hearings. You have six defense lawyers in there. I am not sure
how many are appointed. I know some are. But in such cases, tremen-
dous local costs are suddenly and unpredictably imposed.
One proposal, which has some good ideas in it that need to be re-
fined, of course, was that perhaps the state at this point, if it is not ready
to take over the entire funding of the criminal justice system, should take
over absolute, 100% funding of the major caseload. That way, when you
have a problem such as Corenevsky7 in Imperial County, or McMartin in
Los Angeles County, the state would be responsible for its funding. On
the local level, this would allow predictability in what the local costs are
going to be.
However, as everybody recognizes, the state at this point is not even
meeting its burden of the reimbursement required under section 987 of
the California Penal Code in capital cases.' Of course, having the state
take on the burden of the large cases is but another question. Defining
what constitutes a "major" case is a further problem still.
These problems are demonstrative of the tension between the coun-
ties and the state that appeared in our discussion group: How does a
basically poor county like Imperial afford the Corenevsky case or whether
a large county like Los Angeles should afford a McMartin kind of case?
There were other important proposals made to improve functioning
of the system. One such proposal was for substantial expansion of what
section 987.9 money exactly covers: It should cover additional expenses
and it should cover the situation in which a case is not a death penalty
case, but is filed as a special circumstances, such as a life without parole
situation. The situations to which such funding is provided need to be
expanded to ensure that the level of representation in those cases is con-
stitutionally adequate by enabling appointed counsel to do the necessary
job when faced with those kinds of charges.
Another proposal we discussed-by virtue of my position as the
Chair of the State Bar's Committee on Delivery of Legal Services-is the
proposal for a statewide commission. That commission, as envisioned in
our proposal, is one that would have the ability to go to Imperial County
6. People v. Buckey, No. A750900 (Muni. Ct. of Los Angeles Judicial Dist. filed Mar. 22,
1984); People v. Buckey, No. A753005 (Muni. Ct. of Los Angeles Judicial Dist. filed May 23,
1984).
7. 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1985).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
and study the problem, to go to Los Angeles and study the problem, and
to approve or disapprove the system for delivery of services.
There was great support in our lunch discussion group of that con-
cept, and others suggested expanding the concept. There was an idea
that the commission could also take over the determination of which
cases should be funded on a statewide basis if the other plan is adopted.
There was a suggestion that the types of cases could be isolated by the
commission so that a funding range or even an hourly attorney compen-
sation range could be established for certain types of cases.
Overall, the bottom line was that the main thrust has to be for the
state to pick up its fair share of these costs, no matter how it goes about
it. Whether it is by expansion of an oversight commission with statewide
powers, expansion of section 987.9, fixing the cost of major cases, or
whatever; the clear feeling of everyone involved was that the state is not
meeting its burden.
These cases are not prosecuted in the names of "The People of the
County of Imperial," or "The People of the County of Plumas." They
are prosecuted in the name of "The People of the State of California."
They are considered by the prosecuting authority to be an offense against
"The People of the State of California," yet the people of the State of
California do not fund the cost involved with the case. In other words,
our discussion group clearly agreed that the main focus must be for the
state to pick up its fair share.
In closing, our feelings, I think, were very close to the group led by
Ephraim Margolin. Many people end up with an initial plan that the
state has to fund the whole system, or at least the defense component.
And as that conversation continues, we find there are indeed grave
problems and issues to be addressed, as the state bar symposium discov-
ered two years ago when it went around the state talking to people in
various jurisdictions on that point. It is a difficult question because, as
Sheldon Portman put it, the problem is that California is really an amal-
gamation of several states. That summarizes our committee's lunch dis-
cussion's work.
REPORT FROM DISCUSSION GROUP NUMBER FOUR
Alex Landon****
Group Number Four fell in line with the previous groups and indi-
**** Attorney and Director, Defenders, Inc., San Diego, California. Mr. Landon is cur-
rently President of California Attorneys for Criminal Justice.
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cated that in an ideal program, we would have adequate funding. The
word "adequate" was used, not "unlimited," and there were a number of
county governmental officials who were present in our group who made
it clear that there probably should be some limitation on adequate fund-
ing. But we were unable to arrive at a specific figure or dollar amount or
formula to define what "adequate funding" really means.
However, I think it was clear that everyone agreed that adequate
funding would include adequate staffing, that adequate funding would
include adequate training, and I think most of the people in the group
agreed that the best system to go with would be a public defender system.
In addition, we discussed this concept of whether or not civil work
should be done in a public defender office or whether there should be
separate offices. There was a consensus that there definitely should be
some commitment made to providing funds for counsel to do civil work.
There was a question raised as to how you define the civil work; that
is, if it is a government-raised question, such as a paternity action, that
government should be involved in paying for the services of an attorney.
But if it is a case between two citizens, is government responsible for
picking up the tab? The tendency, I think, was for the people who are
responsible for administering county budgets to be somewhat hesitant
about whether there should be an open-door policy to funding that type
of service.
We also discussed whether or not judges should be involved in the
administration of these programs. And I think it was the consensus of
our group that judges should not be involved; that there should be softe
type of independent board which would be responsible for discussing the
guidelines and discussing what type of program the county should have.
It was discussed that by having judges involved, there are too many con-
flicting interests; and by having judges outside of the program, it is easier
for an independent board to discuss how counsel should be appointed
and how the defense cost should be apportioned.
Finally, we discussed the funding problem. And I think that, as has
been discussed by other groups, there is a strong feeling that the state
should be more involved than it is today.
How to apportion funds was also discussed. I think that everyone in
our group agreed that there should be more emphasis put on equality of
funding. Where there is a district attorney's office funded at the particu-
lar level, there should be more emphasis placed on making sure the de-
fense gets its equal share of the budget. And the formula that has been
used for a number of years-three prosecutors, two defense attorneys-is
perhaps out of date; things have changed. We now have a determinate
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sentencing law in California, and we do have Proposition 8 to contend
with. This provides additional burdens for the defense.
Finally, we discussed whether the county should be completely cut
out of that process of funding; that by giving up the involvement of the
county, we may give up the ability to control what the county gets. And
so I think we were left with a question mark as to whether we should be
going toward complete state funding or whether there perhaps should be
a mix, which would allow the county to retain some type of involvement
in how the money is doled out and how it is apportioned.
REPORT FROM DISCUSSION GROUP NUMBER FIVE
David Heilbront
We had quite a cross-section of people represented in our discussion
group. We had an assembly person, a public defender, some county su-
pervisors, a judge, private lawyers and a county administrative officer.
And we had no trouble figuring out what the goals ought to be: We
thought that the system ought to be infinitely economical, absolutely fair,
serviced by only competent and experienced people, and that it would be
a good idea, in general, if the guilty were convicted and the innocent
went free.
With respect to funding, I guess we join the parade, although by a
fairly small margin. We generally thought that the state really ought to
fund the system.
First, we thought that it is simply wrong for the quality of justice to
depend upon where in the state it happens to be dispensed. If the state
mandates a right-and that's really what we are talking about here-
then the state ought to pay for the realization of that right.
We thought that it really made no sense at all to have a dichotomy
between funding in the appellate process, on the one hand, and in the
trial process, on the other.
Some people expressed concerns about state funding, voiced most
strongly by those representing the smaller counties. People were also
concerned about state control. But nonetheless, we thought funding
ought to come from the state.
We all thought there ought to be statewide standards. We were con-
cerned that without such standards the system would tend to fall apart
and be relatively hit-and-miss as it is presently. Furthermore, we
t Attorney, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Everson, San Francisco, California. Mr. Heil-
bron is currently President of the State Bar of California.
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thought it imperative that somebody monitor the application of those
standards. As to who that would be-some group members thought that
the Bar ought to do it, but those people were not affiliated with the Bar.
County supervisors thought that if there would be a state monitoring
system, then, by God, it ought to be made up of supervisors.
With respect to the civil side of things, we thought that if we were
king, we were ready for the year 1495, and we would do exactly what
King Henry VII did. We were not, however, very confident that that
was going to happen in the year 1984. However, with respect to the
Yarbrough v. Superior Court issue specifically, we were all again very
clear that where the state mandates that you be given a right, the state
ought to pay for it. So I guess we are ready for the cart, if not the horse.
As to the delivery system, we were clear on what we did and did not
want to have. We were all quite clear. We did not want to have a San
Diego contract-type system, although some group members thought that
this might be okay in small counties where you are really dealing on a
personal level with one another. But beyond that, I think most people
basically agreed that we had to be flexible in deciding what type of sys-
tem was right; what was good for a big county might not be good for a
small county. Members representing the big counties seemed confident
that the laboring oar ought to be taken by the public defender's office.
Many group members were intrigued by the San Mateo model under
which, in effect, a block grant is given to the local Bar. The local Bar
then pays based on experience: panels composed of local Bar members
perform the job public defenders perform elsewhere. There is no Public
Defender in San Mateo at all. Although some members expressed con-
cern that this was not the most economical way of delivering legal serv-
ices, all acknowledged that the system seemed to be working out very
well in San Mateo.
Everybody thought that, one way or another, whatever system you
use, it is a good idea to keep the private bar involved. Group members
valued its independence and were quite concerned that the whole thing
not be taken over by an institutional dealer.
I guess the bottom line was that, perhaps expressed only by a bar
type, whatever system you have, in whatever county you have it, it is apt
to function best if there is some kind of local watchdog, probably the
local bar association, actively involved in pushing for what is good and
making a fuss about those things that do not work out.
Thank you.
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REPORT FROM DISCUSSION GROUP NUMBER SIX
Wilbur Littlefieldtt
Mr. Chairman, I see that, as always, we are running late. I will not
repeat what has been said before, which was also discussed in our group.
Just to give you the basic things that we developed would be very helpful.
First, we felt that the program should be state funded. It should be
run by an independent body independent from the legislature.
That with respect to urban areas, a public defender system would be
the best system, with conflicts handled by a panel of the Bar. This panel
would be run by an administrator, and the cases would be assigned based
on the degree of complexity, with the various levels of lawyers, depend-
ing upon their experience and competency. In other areas, it might be a
public defender for several counties, or it might be a panel of lawyers or a
rotation among all of the lawyers if it is a very small county.
So as far as payment is concerned, there was an agreement-on two
ideas, I should say. One was that payment should be on an hourly basis
and that it should be a reasonable sum. The other asked that payment
should be by courtroom incident with perhaps so much money for each
case besides the courtroom incidents. In different cases, attorneys could
apply for additional payment.
We all felt, however, that the present system has problems because
of the fact that there is not enough money to fund adequately defense
services; however, we hope that sometime in the future there will be such
funding. And perhaps it will be a long time from now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.





A PANEL DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL
LEADERS
To conclude the Conference on Financing the Right to
Counsel in California, a panel of three key elected officials dis-
cussed the current prospects for, and problems with, additional
state financing of counsel for indigent defendants. The com-
ments of the Honorable David S. Roberti, President Pro
Tempore of the California State Senate, the Honorable Willie L.
Brown, Jr., Speaker of the California Assembly, and the Honora-
ble Edmund D. Edelman, Chairman of the Los Angeles County
Board of Supervisors, are reprinted below.
Robert D. Raven, Moderator*
Ladies and gentlemen, Senator Roberti, Speaker of the Assembly
Willie Brown, and Chair of the Board of Supervisors in Los Angeles,
Supervisor Edelman: First, we are honored to have you all here today.
We know how busy you are. We are grateful for that. We are grateful
for the interest you had in this subject over the years behind us, and we
look forward to your continuing interest in the years ahead.
We are at the bottom of the program. And the bottom line, like the
bottom line on a budget, really comes down to this question: Where is
the money? And in due course, I am going to start out with a question as
to who should pay.
But before I do that, I would like to give each of our panelists an
opportunity, if they wish, to make any general remarks.
Professor Lefstein, in talking about the national perspective today, is
talking about one of the trends, the trend towards more state financing
and away from local financing. Of course, at this time in the state we
have a dichotomy: We have local financing for trial courts and state
financing for appellate courts.
I am going to ask each of you, if you would comment on whether
you think that we are going to join that national trend and go towards
* Partner, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California. Mr. Raven was President of
the Bar Association of San Francisco in 1971 and President of the State Bar of California in
1981. He is currently California State Delegate to the House of Delegates of the ABA, Chair
of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants for 1978-1980, Lec-
turer for Continuing Education of the Bar, American Law Institute-ABA, and the Practicing
Law Institute.
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more state financing. And I would like to, as a prelude to that, mention a
few things that have been discussed here and some items you might want
to consider.
The groups that have reported indicated that there was a great trend
towards state financing at the beginning of the conference. After the
discussions today people are a little less sure of that and maybe they
would like to see a little more flexible financing system where perhaps the
big cases, like Corenevsky v. Superior Court,' would be special. So what
about some flexible system?
Others have suggested that you cut it by the type of cases, that the
state be concerned with capital cases and most serious felony cases, per-
haps when you get up to fifty years' imprisonment. I would like to hear
your comments.
We had some discussion in our group about this issue. If the state
did do the funding, what does it do to the local control of the justice
system? All of the media often concentrates on the court in talking about
the criminal justice system.
We all know that if we look at it as a process that starts with the law
enforcement people, the prosecutors, the courts and finally the people
that deal with the sanction, what does it do there?
There was concern expressed in some of the groups about this issue:
If it did go to state financing, would we have to be concerned about the
experience we had in the last couple of years with the cut in State Public
Defender programs?
Finally, a point that I am interested in-I do not know about the
group as a whole-but it seems to me that one of the problems is: Who is
the client from the viewpoint of cost control? Right now there is no
problem in that regard because, by and large, the lawyers do not get the
support that they should have, the extra support, the experts and so
forth. But if as we get into this more and as it gets a higher profile, are
we going to have a problem such as we had in the medical field with third
party payers where you do not have that cost control?
In the civil field where I practice, we are now getting cost control
with a vengeance. Corporate counsel are telling us what we can do and
what we cannot do.
So with those matters in mind, I would like to ask each of you to
comment. And maybe it would be appropriate to start with the represen-
tative of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, although I know
you gentlemen represent local government as well.
1. 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1984).
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Honorable Edmund D. Edelman**
I think obviously local government would like the state to always
come to its rescue, especially after Proposition 13, and the state has come
to the rescue.
There were a number of cookies left in that cookie jar that Governor
Jerry Brown had, so we were bailed out. What I see happening, obvi-
ously, is the state having more and more of the funding responsibility.
At least as you pointed out, maybe we should have a fund that would
help counties when a trial was so great-the financial burden was so
great-that a particular county could not meet its obligation.
I guess that happened in one case that we know about, wherein Im-
perial County refused to provide adequate legal defense. Obviously that
kind of system-where the legal defense costs are so great-turns off the
majority of the public to our criminal justice system. And I think we all
suffer as a result of that. I think the state is going to have to face up to
that.
Local governments, particularly counties that have the primary re-
sponsibility of financing or running the criminal justice system, do not
have the revenue-raising abilities that they used to have.
It was simple before Proposition 13. We would simply get our as-
sessed value and then figure out if we wanted to play the political game.
And if the assessed value went up, we lowered the tax rate. If we needed
revenue and the assessment rolls were not sufficient, we would raise the
tax rate. Probably if it was an off-election year, we would raise the tax
rate.
Well, local government does not have that flexibility anymore. That
flexibility is gone and, to some degree, my good colleagues here-who I
know have stood up in very difficult times to help local government-
now have more of the burden of financing local government on them.
Now, I would be willing if they would say to me, "Look, we don't
want the tax review because we take your heat." I would be willing to
just accept some powers of taxation, and let us wrestle with the fallout of
raising revenue at the local level. I would like to see an independent
revenue base and let local officials take the heat.
** County Supervisor, 3rd District, Los Angeles County, California. Supervisor Edelman
was first elected to the City Council, Fifth District for the City of Los Angeles in 1965, and
was re-elected in 1969 and in 1973. In 1974, he was elected to the Board of Supervisors, Third
District, for the County of Los Angeles, and is currently Chair of the Board of Supervisors.
He served as Deputy Legislative Counsel for the California State Legislature, member of the
Intergovernmental Relations Task Force and First Vice-chair of the Administration of Justice
Committee, County Supervisors Association of California.
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Why should you fellows take the heat for raising revenue that we
spend? But this gets mired in the whole question of state versus local
responsibilities and alignments. I think that yes, the state has to do
more. And yes, if you ask the state to do more, you give up some local
control. You cannot ask the state to give you money without some
strings attached. They have the right to attach a few strings, if they give
us the money. So you pay that price.
But I think in terms of the criminal justice system and preserving it,
you are going to need some limitation. Because otherwise, people are
going to point to these cases that cost so much money and they will say,
"Well, where do we get it?" And I think there will be a rejection of the
criminal justice system as we know it.
Honorable David S. Roberti***
Thank you very much.
I guess when we talk about any kind of state financing, we first have
to examine the role of the state as to what its responsibilities and duties
are, and obviously we have to make sure that we have a sufficient amount
of money to provide for those things that are the state's responsibilities.
The first thing in the area of defense of indigents is the State Public
Defender's Office. Now, the State Public Defender has, in my estimation
and maybe yours as well, not been adequately funded. Two years ago,
the Governor vetoed approximately half of the budget for the State Pub-
lic Defender.
It now has come to a point where the budget is stabilized; but, nev-
ertheless, we have a court backlog due, in some part, to the fact that the
kinds of cases that reach the supreme court often are cases dealt with by
the State Public Defender. And the Public Defender himself says there
are numerous cases-one in particular comes to my mind-that he can-
not at this point, with his funding, adequately represent.
So the state has the primary responsibility of funding those institu-
tions which are directly related to the state and it is not currently fulfil-
ling that responsibility.
Now, what do we do as far as local California public defense is con-
* California State Senator, 23rd District, President Pro Tempore, California State Sen-
ate. Senator Roberti is a 17-year democratic veteran of the California Legislature. He was
first elected to the Assembly in 1966 after serving as Deputy State Attorney General, was
elected to the State Senate in 1971, and was elected Chair of the Senate Democratic Caucus in
1975. He later served as Senate Majority Leader for four years. In 1980, Senator Roberti was
elected by his colleagues to the Senate's top leadership post, the office of the President Pro
Tempore, and was re-elected in 1982 and in December of 1984.
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cerned? I would suggest that when we talk about the administration of
the justice system, we have to talk about it in totality and not scrutinize it
down as far as public defender or marshals, bailiffs or whatever.
There were some suggestions last year during the budget negotia-
tions that the state assume the cost of local administration ofjustice. The
negotiations were unsuccessful, but at least the matter was open to
debate.
And I would just suggest that if the state does that, we cannot break
the funding down by assuming the cost of marshals and sheriffs, but not
bailiffs. You have to look at the whole thing in its totality.
Supervisor Edelman made an interesting point; interesting to me,
because I know he has been rather consistent in willing to have the locali-
ties assume more of the California tax base and, at the same time, in
having a greater authority to tax, to have the ability to spend the money
that the localities raise.
But it is interesting to me that, by and large, the vast majority of the
local legislators two years ago were asking for bailout help, especially
when legislation was circulating on something called "Project Indepen-
dence," that was to give localities a greater tax base, to let them tax and
then spend the money where the needs arose.
The agitation for that kind of legislation was very, very great when
we were in recess. As soon as the legislature came back into session,
much of the attention on local bailout came to be just straight-out, direct
remuneration or subventions of state government to local government.
And there was not too much talk about "Project Independence," because
most local officers, like other politicians, frankly would like to be able to
spend the money, but would not want to have the responsibility for rais-
ing the money.
So, Supervisor, your position did not change. But I suspect that
many of the organizations that you belong to did change, and it is a very
great problem.
Frankly, in the current climate and the current realities in Sacra-
mento, I would suggest that for public defense funding the very best we
can do is bring the State Public Defender up to an adequate funding that
is consistent with the real and fair administration of justice and to handle
local problems as we have, and that is through the various measures that
we have passed in the state legislature to attempt to bail out local govern-
ment in a wide variety of other areas.
There is one thing, however, that the legislature has done when a
case becomes extremely expensive to a county. There have been about
four or five instances that I can recall since I have been a member of the
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legislature. We have assumed the cost of those cases. Generally, how-
ever, they are not the kinds of cases that are found in the large metropoli-
tan areas like Los Angeles or the Bay Area, but rather the kinds of cases
that a small county finds itself burdened with where the case itself makes
a very definite impact on the budget of the county.
The state legislature in the past assumed the cost of those cases. But
I would say at this point, that is about the only area where we are going
to single out local public defender and other administration of justice
costs by themselves.
The reality is that, with the court backlog and the needs of the State
Public Defender system, whether the Public Defender himself knows
those needs are pressing or not, the best we can do is to maintain that
kind of funding. And everything else, I think, is going to have to come
under the category of general local relief, local bailout.
That is my opinion and my projection for the future.
Honorable Willie L. Brown, Jr. ****
You must know that Mr. Roberti's description of the atmosphere in
Sacramento is very accurate in that there may be in his house something
less than fifteen people who would be prepared to vote for a proposition
that would directly be used to fund the defense costs of people who com-
mit crimes.
In the Assembly, the number probably of the eighty members who
would be prepared to vote for such a proposition would be less than
twenty-five assemblymen. You should understand that that is, in fact,
the atmosphere that is here.
Legislators-politicians generally-are faced with having to respond
to their voting constituency. In this day and age, their voting constitu-
ency indicates, when properly stroked by people like Senator Bill Rich-
ardson and others, that they really do not want you doing anything on
behalf of anyone who gets arrested for any crime. If the individual gets
arrested, that is the individual's problem. And independent of any re-
sources available through the public sector, that individual should pro-
vide his or her own defense.
**** Speaker, California Assembly. Assemblyman Brown was elected Speaker of the Cali-
fornia Assembly in 1980 and re-elected in 1982 and 1984. During twenty years in the legisla-
ture, he has served as Assembly Majority Floor Leader, Chair of the California Legislative
Black Caucus, Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, Chair of the Revenue and Taxation
Committee, Chair of the Governmental Efficiency and Economy Committee and Democratic
Whip. In 1972 and 1980, Speaker Brown co-chaired the California Delegation to the National
Democratic Convention.
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So, as Mr. Roberti said, one place in which the lack of voter support
evidenced itself to us was when the Public Defender's Office was cut so
dramatically two years ago. We were unable to mount a sufficient
number of votes in each house of the legislature to overcome that; when,
in fact, on merit, by numbers and by all of the logical applications and by
the humane applications, it was clear that we should have been able to
get those numbers.
But the practical problem presented itself; and that was that. If it
had been for law enforcement and for prosecution and for expanding the
opportunity to catch people and to prosecute them, the moneys would be
there because the politics would dictate that that is a good place to spend
the money. If it is for the purpose of trying to protect the integrity of the
defense system and trying to protect the integrity of the criminal justice
system on behalf of everybody, the money is not there to do that.
I am not optimistic about any change in this session of the legisla-
ture. As a matter of fact, I am not optimistic about any change in the
next session of the legislature. Come 1987, there may be a different atti-
tude or there may be a different governor. But before then, I suspect
conditions are going to get worse before they get better.
Because, you see, judges in the court system are going to insist that
when people come before them charged with crimes that may cost them
their liberty, those individuals must be defended. And, they are going to
measure the quality of that defense in the most objective measuring stan-
dard that can be imposed.
And when that happens, a number of cases are going to be bounced
back. Because the State Public Defender, or the system as we now have
it, is so hopelessly underfunded and is so hopelessly overworked, so
hopelessly overloaded with cases, so hopelessly underfunded for investi-
gators and for clerical help and all the other support services, that any
court reviewing a particular conviction or a particular decision is going
to find that this was not an adequate defense. Such a finding will not be
based upon the quality of the person defended, but the resources avail-
able to assist that individual. And when that happens, the attitude about
the courts that is being expressed on a consistent basis is going to harden
and conditions are going to get even worse here in Sacramento.
I am sorry that we cannot frankly, seriously explore, from a legisla-
tive standpoint, transferring the cost of administering the court system
totally to the general fund of the state budget. I suspect if we were able
to do that, we would have probably a greater lobbying effort on behalf of
maintaining a certain quality of expenditures.
Because you see, in many cases, Mr. Edelman, the prosecutors
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would be in there pursuing the same general fund dollars as would the
persons on the defense side. And if the prosecutors had to get their
money from the same trough, they would be hard put to convince the
senate or the assembly to do something greater for them on a per-cost
basis than they would do for the defenders.
But we cannot even address that issue. We cannot even get to the
point. I am talking about the alternatives, about options as you de-
scribed them in your question; because, the political atmosphere will not
permit us to do that.
Mr. Roberti addressed the reality. The only thing we have been able
to do in the time period that we have been here is to provide case-by-case
bailouts to particular counties, but only on occasion when it is so outra-
geous, and then if they have something to exchange with other members
who have something that they need, they may be able to move it through
the halls of the legislature. All on merit; but, nevertheless, they may be
able to move it through the halls of the legislature. And that has been
our experience in those very rare cases.
There may be an opportunity for the State Bar, on a more conserva-
tive measure, to suggest that there ought to be in the Governor's
budget-and it can be put in the Governor's budget from this year's
funding-an amount of money available to local communities to make
application rather than by the billed route.
This should not be the Board of Control, but an amount of money
that could be administered by an appropriate agency of government
under the Governor's direction. Counties could make application for
that assistance on an ongoing basis rather than by way of the processing
money that we currently have; where it becomes a question of whether or
not Mr. Roberti wishes to carry the bill or whether or not Mr. Brown
wishes to carry the bill and cash in all their political capital that they
may have or the equity they have in order to move that bill.
It may be that even this Governor might be willing to put away two,
five, seven, ten million dollars on an experimental basis in this session.
But it cannot come from Senator Roberti, and it cannot come from Wil-
lie Brown, and I suspect it cannot even come from Supervisor Edelman.
It will have to come from a more conservative element that clearly indi-
cates that it is not for the purpose of-in any manner-allowing public
defenders to have access to it.
It is not for the purpose of enhancing and making completely com-
petitive the investigatory arms of the public defense versus the local po-
lice force or the sheriff's department or the marshal's office. But it is for
the purpose of rewarding those who do provide prosecutions in a proper
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manner that allows society's gifts or society's compensation to be given
to society. Under those circumstances, they may very well be able to
have that kind of money set aside; and I would suggest that that might be
a start down the road to ultimately producing some form of state funding
that would allow for a fair and adequate criminal justice system insuring
equal protection under the law.
Let me tell you, in both houses of the legislature almost every mem-
ber will tell you, when you give him or her the respective facts of any
given cases, they will conclude you are correct that that is not equal jus-
tice under the law. But so what? This is not a perfect society. This is an
absolutely terrible response, but a very practical political response.
Those of us who are interested in trying to maintain the concept of
equal justice under the law recognize that it is going to be a long, hard
struggle. And I hope we can change the political atmosphere in the near
future so that we can begin to address the issues.
We can remove the courts from the attacks that they will experience
by virtue of having to do what they believe to be the proper thing to do
and to, I suppose, do the things where the courts are not subject to any
kind of limitation when they assign and adequately compensate compe-
tent counsel, and where it will be possible for competent members of the
bar who really want to work in this area to, in fact, be appropriately
compensated for their efforts.
That is not the case now. The political atmosphere is not there now
to create that. We must create the political atmosphere to allow us to
address it on that very-what I think would be an intelligent-basis.
Thank you.
Robert D. Raven
Thank you for your very candid remarks. I guess I learned some
years ago the difference between the prosecution side and the defense side
when I went out for the swearing-in of the first public defender in our
Northern District of California, United States District Court.
Many of us got up to speak and waxed eloquently on how now the
presumption of innocence was being recognized, that each side was being
cloaked with the dignity of government. Then it came to the question of
who would be the investigative arm for the new public defender.
And I had just gone through a civil case in which I asked the assis-
tant United States Attorney about who had investigated the complaint,
who knew about it, and they came back and gave me the names of
twenty-three FBI agents, whereupon I settled the case. Having that in
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mind, I asked who the investigator for the federal public defender was
going to be, and they pointed out a nice gentleman, who was probably
competent, a retired bailiff of the court. So it came home to me very
clearly that it was, at least at that point, an unequal struggle.
I would like to turn now, if I may, to the civil side of the Yarbrough
problem, the Jaffe v. Superior Court2 problem. We had a very stirring
presentation by Justice Johnson that took us back into history and
pointed out that, nearly 500 years ago in England, the English law was
that indigent people had a right to representation, either plaintiffs or de-
fendants in civil cases. Then he took us through the other countries and
we found out the same thing happened. Then at the second stage, at
some point along the way, the legislative bodies or the courts had taken
the second step and said the appointed counsel will be compensated.
That is before us, of course, the problem in the Yarbrough case, as
we all know. And I would like to have you comment, if I may, on what
the status is now on this. Are we ready for that in California? Are we? I
think by statute all indigent people in even civil cases will have the right
to be represented.
Are we ready for the second step, to be compensated? That is
wound up with the question of whether the bill that was passed last year
and then vetoed, whether that is likely to be passed again. And if so,
whether the Governor will sign it. If anyone wants to speculate on that,
in any event, I would like to ask for your comments on the civil side.
The other point I would like to ask is: What is the prediction as to
whether the legislature will expand those categories where someone in
the civil case cannot afford counsel? We are entitled-now that we have
a situation that is involved in Yarbrough, Payne v. Superior Court3 -
where prisoners under certain circumstances or defendants in paternity
cases are entitled to be represented. Will that be expanded? I know you
cannot speak for the court, but what do you forsee there in the
legislature?
Honorable David S. Roberti
Well, I really do not think that there is going to be much expansion
of programs that are trying to enunciate rights or rights of access for
poor people or even for moderate income people. I first would suggest
that Senator Petris' bill-and I voted for his bill-is that maybe every-
body has access to the court except independent indigents.
2. No. B002890 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. of Cal. (1984)).
3. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
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First, without talking about what our roles in the legislature are, I
speak to your roles as attorneys. Quite frankly, especially in the civil
area, you have access to justice based on how much money you have and
how long you can hold out in court.
And many people, even the middle-class people, would not dream of
using the justice system to right any wrong. Consider it as a setup to
adjudicate differences, for peaceful alleviation of differences. But think
about it. When would any butcher, baker or candlestick maker drop into
a law firm and say they have a property problem with their next-door
neighbor? It is just never going to happen.
Unless you have an insurance company that is representing you in
an auto insurance problem or an attorney representing you in similar
kinds of cases, this whole court system in the civil area that we have built
up, this amazing paraphernalia, is not available to too many people. It is
there only for a select group of wealthy people or corporate litigants, and
it has absolutely no relationship to the average citizen's life.
What is the problem? I think the State Bar has to think a little bit in
terms of identifying the problem. But I suggest one reason why some-
times you do not have too much support for lawyers or for the court
system is simply because the average citizen would not ever dream of
going to court. It is not there for them. And if they are in court through
some terrible misfortune in which they may be sued by somebody who
has more access to discovery, to attorneys, to investigators, to more
money than they do, they are going to settle as quickly as they can and as
cheaply as they can.
Frankly, in my mind, the civil justice system, not only for indi-
gents-that is another issue-but for everybody, is really a convoluted
travesty of litigation for the elite, by the elite and of the elite, and for
nobody else. And I cannot even blame that one on Governor
Deukmejian. It has been here for quite some time.
Part of the problem is the profession itself. And I am a lawyer. Part
is just the problem of inability to address the situation, everybody going
about his or her own way, not attempting to deal with the totality of the
situation. But whether or not this civil justice system which has evolved
has any relationship to the average citizen is a serious issue.
Frankly, I think in your heart of hearts, you know that the problem
does not have any relationship at all to the vast majority of the public.
They just would not dream of trying to hold out in court if they were
being sued and never would dream of suing if they had the opportunity,
unless it is one of the standard kinds of cases, like an automobile acci-
dent, or unless it is a class action suit of great sex appeal. If your prop-
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erty abuts the XYZ Insurance Company and they have taken three
inches of your property, you are not going to court. But they might go to
court against you.
And those kinds of day-to-day disputes that people are engaged in
mean a lot to an average citizen. There is just no remedy for the average
citizen to find redress in the criminal justice system.
As far as indigents are concerned, I think it is just a temper of the
times in Sacramento; I really do not think we are going to be able to
broaden the categories although I think we ought to.
But there are so many areas that demand our funding, and we are in
a mind fix in Sacramento that if we address the status quo and continue
the status quo and try to keep everything together, we have done our job,
as if there are no problems with the future. And we have no vision of the
future that has to be addressed. That is just something for another day
and another year, because we are in a bookkeeping mode right now.
I suggest that I am not optimistic. The best that leaders of the legis-
lature can do in these areas-and we are speaking in terms of a social
program-is to hold the line and maintain what we have. And I would
say that is across the board with both civil and criminal justice.
Some bills passed by my house leave much to be said about the lim-
itless power of people to lead the legislature, which is absolutely not true.
There are some things the Speaker and I both care about very much,
especially many areas of civil liberties where you simply have to see some
things pass even though you do not want them to pass, where we are
trying to hold the line for the Bill of Rights. I would suggest that it is
going to be very difficult to expend your capital on something which is
important, but considered of secondary importance; that is, expansion of
public defender rights in civil cases.
And I think that is a tenor of the times right now in Sacramento. It
is the tenor of the times in our state. And those of us who have a differ-
ent vision are going to have to wait it out and have to be more clever and
wilier than the opposition. But those kinds of battles in which you really
believe the problems must be addressed are just not always yours to be
won. As I said, we both would like to see the categories expanded, but
realistically that will not occur.
Finally, let me tell you that I do not think a motion in either house
of the legislature that said, "We believe that everybody should be repre-
sented on each side of each civil case at public expense," could get a
sufficient number of votes to cause a resolution to be passed. That would
never pass either house in the legislature, and I am not even sure that the
members I previously predicted would be there would vote for that kind
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of a proposal. So realistically, an answer, in part, to your question is no.
No!
Honorable Edmund D. Edelman
Generally, I have been critical of the bar, both criminal and civil,
when it comes time to reform the justice system.
For example, the County of Los Angeles needs more judges. We
know that we need about forty more judges, but the bill that was signed
by the Governor, that went through the legislature, provided only eigh-
teen judges, I believe. Those judges cost the local taxpayers money. I
think the state gives us some help on the judges' salaries, ninety percent
of the judges' salaries.
But then if you have a criminal court, paying the criminal cost, the
cost for criminal involvement with the sheriff and all other court attend-
ants, those are local costs. Therefore, I have taken a position that we
have a role to play and ought to get the civil and criminal justice system
improved.
And that means that some of the lawyers have to give up some of
what they have been used to in state courts. For example, the judicial
voir dire-the lawyer voir dire as compared to judicial voir dire that you
have in federal courts-to eliminate some of the peremptory challenges
so that we can speed the system along, so we do not always have to keep
adding more and more judges without changing the system.
Now, I think that is going to be very difficult, because the Bar Asso-
ciation's trial lawyers do not want to give up anything. They like the
system as it is because they probably, for their purposes, reach their
goals. It gives them the greatest ability to represent their clients. But
you have to look at the cost of the system for everyone, for the taxpayers
who are supporting and assisting it. And it cries out for some reform.
And I must differ a little bit with my good colleague David Roberti.
He says people do not have access to the system. They do have access. It
is true it is a delayed access. It is true that sometimes it is a costly access.
But the bar makes that possible by virtue of taking a case on contingency
to be fulfilled, if you are successful.
So I believe that people do have access. Not all have as much as
others, but the average person does have access. Cases are fied. We
have a very litigious society. More cases are filed every year than the
year before. So while that access is there, it is not as swift. It is not as
cost-free. There is expense involved.
I think we all share responsibility for improving the system, includ-
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ing the Governor-who I see was invited to be here today, but unfortu-
nately is not here. He has the top position in the state. I believe that he
should be calling for some reforms in the civil and criminal justice system
so that we can reduce the cost, so that we can continue the system that
we all enjoy in this country.
We all take this system for granted. And yet we see that it is under
attack from the standpoint of providing fair and equal justice to all. I
think we all have an obligation to maintain that system, to improve that
system, and I think that is the way to keep it going rather than just say,
well, it is too expensive and so on.
Let us find out where it is too expensive. Let us make some changes.
Let us enact legislation that will maintain that system and improve that
system. And I am hopeful. That is why I am not going to vote for more
judges continually, not just because it is a Republican who is going to
make the judicial appointments. I think it is important across the board
that we get some reform in the system and we get some consensus from
the trial part, the defense part, and move ahead in California to bring our
system somewhat in tune with the times.
Honorable Willie L. Brown, Jr.
On the comments made by Mr. Edelman, I would be very, very
careful about reforming the system by addressing substantive aspects of
the system without clear commitment to adequately fund whatever sys-
tem eventually results.
Too often in these halls of the legislature, you can develop the thrust
to allegedly reform the system. And what they mean by "reform" of the
system is to make it easier for "the haves" to continue to win or to make
it easier to give the business to the indigents by restricting the opportu-
nity for attorneys to represent people on a contingency fee basis.
And they do that, Mr. Edelman. They come here with a measure
that proposes to, first, eliminate contingency fee arrangements; or if they
cannot eliminate them, they want to restrict them to ten percent of the
bounty; or they want to propose periodic payments of the lawyer's fee, as
well as for the winning litigant. All of those things have zero to do, in
my opinion, with reducing the cost of the system and thereby expanding
the opportunity for equal justice under the law with the civil and crimi-
nal situations.
The thrust will always be, in my opinion, to reform by taking away
some of the rights people currently enjoy, while under no circumstances
providing adequate funding which is desperately needed and has been
desperately needed for a long time. To change the opportunity to ex-
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amine jurors by lawyers probably is not a savings at all, ultimately. And
it certainly does not change the fact that a retired bailiff is the investiga-
tor for the public defender's offices and every single solitary person work-
ing for the Attorney General's office is available as an investigator on an
unlimited basis. On the other side of the issue, the person who selects the
jury does not contribute at all to expanding equal justice of the law or
access to equal justice under the law under those circumstances.
So I would be very careful before I would join a movement; I would
be very careful before I sign on with a movement in pursuit of savings by
restricting the rights of human beings. I would be very, very careful
about it.
Robert D. Raven
Let me turn for a moment now to go back to the criminal defense
side and to the question of what is the best system and what is the best
mixture.
And again, group discussion on that was very revealing in the re-
ports; mostly, the preference was toward a mixed system of a public de-
fender's office and assigned counsel involved in a private bar. But we
know there are other alternatives. There are the alternatives of a public
defender office and an alternative public defender office for conflict cases.
I think the Supervisor has spoken on that.
I appreciate that Senator Roberti and the Speaker are probably not
going to get a chance to pass on those things in this year or the next year,
but we would be very interested in their remarks. So I will start with the
Supervisor. What do you see as the best system?
Honorable Edmund D. Edelman
The experience in Los Angeles County has been an interesting one.
Let me just share with you what our experience has been. The county
runs a large publicly-financed public defender system: 420 attorneys and
54 investigators.
We have done a good job in Los Angeles County, but not good
enough; what we are finding is that there are some problems not neces-
sarily with the public defender-because that office is run very well-but
with court-appointed attorneys.
I do not know how many of you read the Los Angeles Times or
listen to Channel 4, KNBC, but one of our supervisors asked for a list of
the highest paid attorneys who were court-appointed to represent indi-
gent defendants when there is a conflict or unavailability of public de-
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fenders. Obviously then, the individual is entitled-the individual
defendant is entitled-to proper representation. Well, these figures were
somewhat shocking. One attorney, over a period of one and one-third
years, received $352,000.
Now, let me make it clear. I am not saying that he was not entitled
to it. I am not suggesting that at all; but just repeating to you what the
figures show. The second highest paid attorney received $300,000. The
third highest paid attorney received $278,000.
The CAO further found that one attorney averaged 77 hours per
week of billing and one week as high as 128 hours. This is a court ap-
pointed attorney. One judge awarded hourly rates of up to $140. The
average was $60 to $65 per hour.
There was one attorney who received per diem payments on occa-
sions when he claimed that he was in both the municipal and superior
courts on that same day. It could have been that he had an assistant.
Again, I am only repeating what the CAO said. With the records
that were kept, documentation of ten percent of the reimbursements was
not available. So the amount of payments could have been higher.
Now, I say this to you not to criticize the judges or to criticize the
attorneys, but just to tell you that there is a lot of money being paid to
private attorneys. I have long believed that we should have in Los Ange-
les County, with the high number of cases that we have, a second public
defender office that would handle the conflict cases.
According to Wilbur Littlefield, the number of cases appointed be-
cause of conflict or because of unavailability run around ten to fifteen
percent, sometimes as high as twenty percent. It is going down, but it is
running around five percent. So it is twenty percent, at the most. You
could do away with that by having a second public defender. You are
probably not going to have a third public defender, so you are going to
have to use the outside bar.
The question is: What method do you use? I have tried to get the
second public defender office created and have not been successful. Only
one vote. None of my colleagues wanted to support that idea.
And that is even though it shows-and the CAO made a study on
my motion-it would have saved millions of dollars every year. That is
obviously because a public defender costs thirty, thirty-five or forty-five
dollars per hour or less, whereas a court appointed attorney is going to be
hired by the court at more money. It is cheaper to do it by more county
employees. We have not taken the second public defender, but we have
set up an alternate defense counsel.
An alternate defense counsel, how does that work? We have not
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done this in all cases because it takes the consent of the courts. You can
not just tell the courts you are going to do this. They have to consent
that they will utilize this alternate defense counsel. The alternate defense
counsel is not a county employee. He is under contract.
The chief person, Karl Jones, is the fellow that is the alternate de-
fense counsel. And he hires attorneys. He interviews. They are gener-
ally ex-city attorneys, ex-district attorneys. They have had some
experience in the criminal area, obviously, and they are hired at a salary.
But they work for the alternate defense counsel. We have not saved
through this means as much as we would have saved by a second public
defender, but we have saved about $400,000 this year.
Now, not all the courts have agreed to this. We only have it operat-
ing in certain courts of Los Angeles County. We have it in twenty-six
municipal court districts. The other courts use their own system. They
hire, or appoint, whomever they want. The judge can do whatever he
wants, hire whomever he wants to handle a case. And we know that
some of the problems mentioned by people this morning were created
when a judge appoints attorneys, because that sets up potential conflicts.
We ought to be concerned about that.
Now, Alameda County, I am told, uses a panel where the attorneys
are graded A, B and C, and they handle the varieties of complexity of the
cases. The judge selects from that package. He has veto power. That is
another way to go. You have also, in other counties, maybe other sys-
tems. There is no perfect system. It depends upon which kind of county
you are in. It depends upon the kind of control you exercise.
Maybe the court appointed counsel would not be so bad if the
county would exercise some control and the courts would exercise some
control over this kind of information. When it gets out to the public that
$300,000 is being paid to attorneys billing 128 hours per week, it raises a
lot of questions.
And so the system itself has to be carefully devised. I think it has to
be protective of the public treasury, yet it has to guarantee that the de-
fendant is going to receive adequate representation. And it is up to all of
us to make sure that that is done.
I think we are making some inroads. The county is expanding with
the judges' help now. We got a letter from the presiding judge of the Los
Angeles County Municipal Court, where he is saying we are now going
to have this system in the arraignment court and in the trafic court. But
he is saying we ought not try it yet in the general criminal court because
the superior court does not want to do it, and we are going to have to
bang some heads. Again, it is very difficult.
Dec. 1985]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:417
The judges in the judicial system are an independent body of the
State of California, and we have to respect that. But we need their coop-
eration. Because if we do not reform the system, if we do not do it inter-
nally-and I say this to my good friend Willie Brown-if we do not do it,
then we face these initiatives. These initiatives get on the ballot, and that
causes a good deal of damage.
It is difficult to bring change about. And maybe sometimes when
you want to change something, you are better off leaving it alone for fear
of what may come out of this system.
But on the other hand, I think if we do not reduce the cost for pro-
tecting the rights of individuals, protecting fairness, protecting equal jus-
tice under the law, then I think we are going to face many more
initiatives coming down the line.
So I am working at my level to do this. And I am appealing to my
good colleagues. They know this legislature better than anybody; other-
wise, they would not be in the position they are in. So I defer to them
and I respect them. But I think we have got to keep working at the local
level and the state level to try to help bring some reforms; not to do away
with rights, but reforms that will truly help this system survive.
Honorable David S. Roberti
A system which relies on a public defender system is probably the
better in terms of representation involved. I frankly feel that there is a
certain amount of departmental dignity that the public defender is going
to want to keep for his clients and use as part of a career rather than even
the best paid of the private defender system. This does not mean that all
private defenders are poor; but, there is less control over that kind of
representation.
I think the Los Angeles system is about the best that I know about.
And Supervisor Edelman and his colleagues obtaining alternate defense
counsel does give a certain amount of control over the types of represen-
tation and of the costs that are involved, and I think it is a system that is
going to work. It has worked for the people of Los Angeles County.
But just frankly, my feeling is that in terms of representation, the
feeling of self-esteem in the department, a well-funded public defender
program is, in the long run, preferable to private counsel taking cases.
But in many cases it is seen as a chore or a burden, to be dispensed with,
and neither the quality of representation nor the cost savings are the
kinds of considerations that will be priority.
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Honorable Willie L. Brown, Jr.
I would agree, Supervisor Edelman, and also with Senator Roberti
in indicating to you that the public defenders' office on a structured basis
is preferable from my standpoint. And that is the one that I would like
to support in every way.
I have great respect for my colleagues in the bar who get appointed
to all these cases; but I also respect your plight, Supervisor Edelman.
Some of the hourly billings of lawyers, including my own office, are just
outrageous, outrageously offensive and held up by example as to what
things should not be done by way of funding.
And as long as we are going to have that way of funding and as long
as we are going to have the brothers of the bar billing 124 hours per week
to the public sector-and I guarantee you the private sector was billed a
similar number of hours in that week, probably beyond the number of
hours that actually were in that week-that just makes life awfully com-
plicated for those of us that have to do the defending. And we would
rather get out of that. And the best way is to do it by way of a
subdefender.
Secondly, I suspect, as Mr. Roberti said, the quality of the represen-
tation is substantially enhanced across the board. There will obviously
be some areas in which that is not the case. But on balance, ninety to
ninety-five percent of the public defenders are superior, skilled persons at
that effort.
Just on an ongoing basis, they are more familiar with it. They are
more familiar with the nuances of it. They know the bailiffs. They know
all the local things that are not on the statutes and not in the case prece-
dent that also have some application to the criminal defense system.
And it seems to me the public defender is in a better position to know
that and, in fact, should be adequately funded. And I do favor the con-
cept of the public defender.
I am impressed with the Alameda County situation in which, for
conflict purposes, there is a predetermined panel. There also ought to be
a predetermined fee for that panel so you eliminate the need to do 127
hours of billing in a single week in order to be adequately compensated
for what your efforts obviously are at $62 an hour. I do not know any
lawyer that is working for $62 an hour these days, unless he is billing you
for four hours for each one that he works.
So I think it would be better if we go for a fee-for-service basis. It is
a stated amount and is an absolutely adequate amount for those in the
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private sector who decide to become a part of that panel. And the selec-
tion process would be from that panel only in the conflict situations.
I was unaware of your contract arrangement with Mr. Jones in Los
Angeles County. I am also impressed with that method of handling your
conflict cases. But I would frankly like to have us utilize an adequately
staffed public defender's office, fully funded and with a better quality of
representation at a price that is politically defensible and defendable, and
probably at a price less than it costs us currently.
